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SEC RULE 10b-5 A RECENT PROFILE
In the years since a private right of action was first implied under
SEC Rule 10b-5, the statutory framework of securities regulation has
undergone a steady metamorphosis. Today section 10 (b) and Rule 1Ob-5
are the most dynamic of federal securities regulations. In fact, section
10 (b), by way of Rule 1Ob-5, has usurped the function of virtually every
provision of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts which specifically provide for
private rights of action. This usurpation has been facilitated by the
absence of statutory restrictions on the use of section 10.
Due to the unforeseen expansion of Rule 1Ob-5, the securities industry
has been rocked by sigmficant extensions in the area of proscribed conduct. As a result, some securities experts and corporate issuers view
the advent of lob-5 with alarm. They regard the maturation of the Rule
as a cancer in the securities laws. However, other experts welcome the
new remedy as a panacea for an ailing and ill-drawn statute.
The status of the elements of Rule 10b-5 is changing every day This
note, which will document the current condition of the Rule, should
be helpful to the practitoner for this reason alone. However, it will go
further and will examine the probable course of recent trends and where
appropriate, will flag those areas most deserving of reform.
The first problem facing the practitioner when he attempts to utilize
Rule lob-5 is the determination of the elements which he must prove
at trial. These include, in one form or another, scienter, materiality,
reliance, causation, jurisdictional means, privity, defendant's status as a
purchaser or seller, and plaintiff's status as a purchaser or seller. The
scienter requirement and the purchaser-seller rules seem to be in the
greatest state of flux and will be extensively treated. In addition, some
familiarity with the statutory history of section 10 (b) and the SEC hearings in respect to Rule lob-5 will be helpful to the practitioner in recognizing judicial bootstrapping in the use of nebulous "policy" pronouncements contained therein in order to justify a particular case result
which the judiciary feels to be equitable. Finally, the emerging area of
"tippee" liability will be analyzed so as to present the reader with a
practical example of the flexibility of Rule 1ob-5 in a microcosm.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A cursory reading of section 10(b) 1 discloses two significant charac1. Section 10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
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teristics. First, in that it depends upon the issuance of rules and regulations by the Commission, the subsection is not self-operative. By its
terms, section 10(b) refrains from prohibiting any specific conduct or
activity It confers upon the SEC a broad rulemaking power to proscribe
the use of devices or contrivances, which the Commission determines to
be contrary to either the public interest or the well being of investors,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 2 The second
feature is the uncertainty of 10(b)'s operation, given the pervasive use
of broad language in the delegation of this executing power to the
Commission.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national
securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any mampulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraventon of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
2. The need for flexible delegation of rulemaking power is pointed out in the following excerpt from one of the House Reports:
The original bill submitted to the committee dealt very specifically and
defirtely with a number of admitted abuses. In many cases, however, the
argument was made that while the solutions offered might be correct, their
effects were so far-reaching as to make it inadvisable to put these solutions
in the form of statutory enactments that could not be changed in case of
need without Congressional action. Representatives of the stock exchanges
constantly urged a greater degree of flexibility in the statute and insisted
that the complicated nature of the problems justified leaving much greater
latitude of discretion with the admimstrative agencies than would otherwise
be the case. It is for that reason that the bill in dealing with a number of
difficult problems singles out these problems as matters appropriate to be
subject to restrictive rules and regulations, but leaves to the administrative
agencies the determinaton of the most appropriate form of rule or regulation to be enforced. In a field where practices constantly vary and where
practices legitimate for some purposes may be turned to illegitimate and
fraudulent means, broad discretionary powers in the admimstrative agency
have been found practically essential, despite the desire of the Committee to
limit the discretion of the administrative agencies so far as compatible with
workable legislation.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong, 2d Sess., 6-7 (1934).
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In an attempt to isolate the meaning of this section,3 as Well as Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder, both the intent of Congress in 1934, and
in the intent of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942, have
been extensively reviewed.4 Unfortunately, but understandably, 5 these
attempts at elucidation have been generally unsuccessful in formulating
any commonly accepted interpretations of the section.6

Congressional Intent 1934
With respect to the particular Congressional purpose of 10 (b) within
the framework of federal securities regulation, there is a dearth of explanatory legislative material. 7 Aside from those parts of the Congressional reports which enumerate and clarify the various sections of the
Act,8 section 10 is specifically mentioned only once, " in a rather ambiguous reference which was probably directed to present section
10(a), rather than 10(b) 10
3. See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1421-30 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as L. Loss]; 6 L. Loss, 3526-28 (1969 Supp.); A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw; FRAUD-SEC RuLE lOb-5 § 2.2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as A. BROMBERG].
4. See, e.g., Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 48 N.C.
L. REv. 482, 496-503 (1970); Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 58
Nw. U.L. REv. 171 (1964); Lowenfels, Codification and Rule iOb-5, 23 VAND. L. REv.
590 (1970); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intent? 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963).
5. Recently a rather experienced researcher has confessed to the Supreme Court that
he was unable to locate any "specific legislative history concerning the 'in connection
with' phrase" of section 10(b) Brief for SEC as amicus curiae at 14, Superintendent
of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 92 S. Ct. 165 (1971).
6. Though there is a wealth of printed material dealing with section 10(b) and
Rule 1ob-5, no author has been acclaimed as having found the precise set of facts or
field of liability intended by Congress when it wrote 10(b). Compare Ruder, supra
note 4 'with Joseph, supra note 4.
7. An outline of the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
of the other Securities Acts is presented in Duncan, Selected Bibliography Including
Legislative History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Statutes It Administers, 28 GEo. WASH. L. R~v. 938 et seq. (1959)
8. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 21 (1934); H.R. RE'. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1934) See also the
remarks of Senator Fletcher for an explanation of S.2693 which was the original bill
introduced in the Senate. 78 CoNG. REc. 2271 (1934)
9. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934) states:
In addition to the discretionary and elastic powers conferred on the administrative authority, effective regulation must include several clear statutory provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions, aimed at those
mampulauve and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 10, and 16.
10. Since the quoted section of the report is prefaced "'[I]n addition to the discretion-
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The general remedial purpose of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is well
documented, 1 but 10(b)'s role was never really clarified by Congress.
It still remains vague at best, at least if one is searching for a direct
expression of Congressional intent.1 2 Nor does an examnation of the
sectional explanations contribute to the clarification, since none of them
provide any significant insight into the purpose of 10(b), they are in
actuality no more than a paraphrase of that section of the Act."
The most frequently cited indicator of legislative purpose m regard
to section 10(b) is the testimony of an adminstrative spokeman who
participated in the drafting of the bill. In referring to this testimony,
Professor Loss remarks:
When the Administration's spokesman, Mr. Corcoran was describing the bill in the legislative heanngs, he devoted a single sentence
to what is now § 10(b)- "Subsection [(b) ] says, 'Thou shalt not
devise any other cunning devices.' "14
From this, 10(b) has been labelled an "acknowledged catchall." '5 As
such, the section has been the subject of much criticism by the securities
ary and elastic powers conferred on the administrative authority," it would appear that
section 10(b) was not being commented upon since its terms clearly delegate such a
flexible power to the Commission.
11. See, e.g., Presidental Message, S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934);
78 CONG. REc. 7861 (1934) (remarks of Congressman Lea, one of the floor leaders of
the bill in the House); 78 CONG. Rxc. 2270 (1934) (remarks of Senator Fletcher on
S. 2693).
12. In discussing implied civil liability under Rule iob-5, one author takes the position
that under the tort theory of liability, legislative intent is not relevant. Joseph, supra
note 4, at 174.
13. Section 10(b), in substantially the same form as it exists today was originally
section 9(c) of Senate bill S.2693. The Senate's sectional discussion of the bill substituted for S.2693 adds nothing to the words of the statute. S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934).
Even when the House completed work on their version of the bill prior to its
submission to a Conference Committee, their report treated the section only to the extent
that it related to short sales and stop loss orders. Regulation of these devices was within
the ambit of section 9(b) [now section 10(a)] of the Senate bill. No mention was made
of what is presently section 10(b). H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934).
The Conference Reports are equally lacking in helpful discussion. S. Doc. 185, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. Rnp. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
14. 6.1; Loss, .supranote 3, at 3528.
15. A. BROMBERGV, supra note 3, S 22.
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as delegating to the Commission broad power to prohibit
17
anything.
virtually
industry,'

SEC Intent 1942
One commentator relates that in 1941 the Securities and Exchange
Commission and representatives of the securities industry jointly proposed to Congress that a loophole in the scheme of federal securities
regulation be closed. 8 At that date the Securities Act contained a federal anti-fraud arsenal, as a supplement to state remedies, consisting of:
(1) Section 17 of the 1933 Act, 9 proscribing fraud in the sale of securities, and of general application to actions against fraudulent sellers,
and
(2) Section 15(c) [presently section 15(c) (1)] of the 1934 Act, 0
covering fraud in the purchase or sale of securities, which was applicable only to fraud perpetrated by brokers or dealers in securities.
At that time, section 10(b) was dormant, and there was nothing in
either Act which provided a federal remedy, injunctive or otherwise,
for fraud, in connection with the purchase of a security, and perpetrated by a person other than a broker or dealer. 2 ' Congress has never
taken action to remedy this oversight.
Given the failure to secure prior Congressional assistance, the Commission issued the Rnle,2 apparently as part of an effort to close the
16. In Epstein, supra note 4, at 496, the author remarks that section 10(b) was
generally regarded as of little significance when it was enacted. Professor Loss agrees.
6 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 3528.
17. See generally, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and HR. 8720 on Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Comm. on Int. and For. Commerce, 73d Cong, 2d Sess., at
115 (1934).
18. Loss, The Fiduciary Concept As Applied To Trading By Corporate "Insiders"
In The United States, 33 MoD. L. REv. 34, 41 (1970).
19. 15 US.C. S 77q (1970).
20. 15 US.G. § 78o (1970).
21. Loss, supra note 18.
22. The full text of Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 issued May 21, 1942,
provides:
The Securities Exchange Commission today announced the adoption of a
rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of
securities. The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of
securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole m the protections against fraud adminstered by the Commission by
prohibiting individuals or compames from buying securities if they engage m
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existing hiatus in the federal legislation.2 3 However, Mr. Milton Freeman, who is sometimes accredited with the issuance of Rule lOb-5, suggests that it was adopted in a somewhat more casual fashion, as a result
of a certain instance of fraudulent activity disclosed to the Commission, involving fraudulent misrepresentations of a purchaser in connection with his purchases of stock. 4 The prefatory comments of the
Comnussion in issuing 1ob-5 clearly indicate an intent to conclude fraud
in the purchase of securities, and to that extent lend support to Mr.
Freeman's remarks. 5 However, as a result of the general, nonspecific
language of the Rule itself, its scope is as yet undetermined. If the Rule
is directed solely at fraudulent purchasers, why does it also refer to
26
sales?
Tlus uncertainty was evident not only in regard to the transactions to
be covered, it also left unanswered the question of the existence of a
private remedy under lob-S. In the opinion of Mr. Freeman, no private
fraud in their purchase. The text of the Commission's action follows:
The Securities and Exchange Commission, deeming it necessary for the
exercise of the functions vested in it and necessary and appropriate in the
public interest and for the protection of investors so to do, pursuant to
authority conferred upon it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, particularly Section 10 (b) and 23 (a) thereof, hereby adopts the following Rule

X-10B-5:
Rule X-IOB-5. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to ormt to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
rmsleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
23. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 2.2; Note, SEC Acton Against Fraudulent
Purchasers of Securities, 59 HARV. L. REv. 769 (1946). The first admnistrative investigatory action taken under Rule 10b-5 was settled by agreement with the parties against
whom the SEC was proceeding. As a consequence no legal action was initiated. Matter
of Purchase and Retirement of Ward La France Truck Corporation Class "A" and Class
"B" Stocks, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3445 (June 11, 1943).
24. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAw. 891, 922 (1967).
25. Id.
26. See generally Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961) (the court proposes four alternative constructions for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); 115 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 618, 622 (1967).
27. Neither section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 explicitly provide a private civil remedy for
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remedy was intended by the Commission, and he attributes the development of private liability under 10b-5 solely to the "ingenuity of the
members of the private Bar, starting with the Kardon case." 28 The
repercussions of J.1. Case v. Borak,29 now reinforced by mere footnote

mention in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty
Company, ° have settled the question in favor of private civil liability
But neither Court actually found, or thought it necessary to find, a
clear intent that Congress or the SEC originally intended private liability
to accrue under section 10(b) or under Rule lOb-5
It is obvious upon analysis that the "Classic 10b-5" is a protean creature, a product of disjointed Congressional and administrative intent."'
Given the lack of significant express reference to section 10 (b) (or any
of its progenitors) in the Congressional materials, courts and writers
have often taken license to seize upon the more general sections of the
reports, 2 the preamble sections of the Act,33 and the wealth of general
conduct which is in violation of their terms. Nonetheless, Kardon v. National Gypsum,
69 F Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), held that such a remedy could be implied. In J.I.
Case v. Borak 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the securities world was again given confirmation,
at least by implication, that 10b-5 was a vehicle that private parties could utilize for
civil redress of their grievances. The question has recently been treated specifically in
regard to 10(b) and 10b-5 by the Supreme Court decision in Bankers Life. Justice
Douglas, delivering the opinion of the Court, saw fit to give only footnote mention to
the fact that "[i]t is now well established that a private right of action is implied under
5 10(b)." Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 92 S. Ct. 165
n.9 (1971) In light of this development, even though authors have vigorously argued
against such a conclusion, it must now be taken as a settled matter that 10b-5 will
yield damages in a federal forum. See generally North, Implied Liability Cases Under
The Federal Securities Laws, 4 CoaPi. PAcT. COMM. 1 (1962)
28. Freeman, supranote 24.
29. 377 U.S.426 (1964)
30. 92 S. Ct. 165, 169 n.9.
31. A comment from a recent article relating the almost boundless expansion of
Rule 10b-5 states the following experience of the author:
Several weeks ago I told one of the ablest and most experienced corporate
counsel in California that my assigned topic was "What lies ahead under
Rule 1Ob-5?" He advised me to stand up and say- "Chaos!", and then sit
down. Another friend of mine who is a corporate lawyer said: "Really,
it seems to me that it is quite simple. Under Rule lob-5 whenever stock
is sold, if the price goes up-the seller can sue the buyer; if the price goes
down-the buyer can sue the seller; if the price remains absolutely the same,
each one can sue the other for interest!"
Marsh, What Lies Ahead Under Rule lOb-5?, 24 Bus. LAW 69 (1968).
32. See, e.g., Superintendent of Insurance v Bankers Life and Casualty Company, 92
S. Ct. 165 (1971); Drachman v. Harvey, 1972 CCH .FEa. SEc. L. RaP. 93,345 at 91865, n.3
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legislative comment in the Congressional Record," to support the posiuons which they seek to advance. This factor alone significantly contributes to generating the conflicting views among the circuits as to
the proper theory of 10(b), as well as the parties entitled to relief m
federal courts under the terms of its provisions. Thus, future mterpretatons of lob-5 -will be dictated not by reference to incisive Congressional comments-rather they will rest upon judicial decisions grappling
with an amorphous conception.
SCIENTER

Although section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 have evolved as anti-fraud
provisions35 within the framework of the 1934 Exchange Act, courts are
widely divided on the question of whether or not to include the common law fraud requirement of scienter in their judicially implied civil
remedy under the section and rule.3 6 Courts have been forced to examine common law concepts of fraud in order to determine the requisite
elements of a lob-5 cause of acton.37 In this examination, the courts
have discovered and adopted a plethora of phrases purporting to define
scienter.
Scienter originally meant a specific intent to defraud a particular
plaintiff.38 Specific intent has now been discarded 9 in favor of defining
(2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
33. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 212 (2d Cir. 1968).
34. See, e.g., Brief for SEC as amicus curiae supra note 5, at 15, 27
35. Professor Loss finds Rule lob-5 to be the broadest of all ann-fraud provisions.
3 L. Loss, supra note 3, 932-42.
36. See Kardon v. National Gypsum, 73 F Supp. 798 (ED. Pa. 1946).
The courts allowing 10b-5 actions held early that a plaintiff need not prove all the
elements of common law fraud to make out a 10b-5 action. Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F Supp. 808, 831 (D. Del. 1951).
37. The common law elements of fraud were misrepresentation, materiality, scienter,
privity, reliance, and causation. See Meisenholder, Scienter and Reliance as Elements
in Buyer's Suit Against Seller Under Rule 10b-5, 4 CorP. PRSc. Comm. 27 (1963); W
PaossEa, HAmBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 700, 736 (3d ed. 1964).
38. Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 377 (1889)
39. In Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.LA. L. REv.
583, 589 (1958), the author divides the state of mind of a party making a misrepresentation into five possible classes: (1) justifiably convinced of the truth of the statement,
or (2) believing in the truth of the statement, but knowing that he has insufficient
knowledge on which to base such a belief, or (3) having no genine belief whatsover
in either the truth or the falsity of the statement, or, (4) realizing that the statement
was-probably false, or (5) convinced of the falsity of the statement.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:860

scienter in varying degrees of culpability.' ° Professor Loss suggests
that "[s] cienter
has been variously defined to mean everything from
knowing falsity with an implication of mens rea, through the various
gradations of recklessness, down to such non-action as is virtually equivalent to negligence or liability without fault.
" 4'
Courts have done little to vitiate the confusion surrounding the
concept of scienter by variously defining it as: a general intent to
deceive, 42 the knowledge of misstatements, 4 recldessness, 44 or mere
negligence. 45

Bases for the Scienter Requirement
Any proper determination of the necessary scienter requirement
should come from the express language of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 However, it may be argued that a tort theory is also a basis for
46
determining what degree of scienter is required in a 1Ob-5 action.

1. Rule 10h-5
Rule lOb-5 makes no reference to a specific scienter requirement. The
Rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or decit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security 4 7
40. W. PNossER, supra note 37, at 715-17
41. 3 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1432.
42. Gould v. Tricon, Inc., 272 F Supp. 385 (SD.N.Y. 1967); Weber v. C.M.P
Corp., 242 F Supp. 321 (SD.N.Y. 1965).

43. L lobus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 286 F Supp. 188 (SD.N.Y. 1968).
44. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (Judge Friendly,
concurring).
45. Id. at 855 (majority opimron).
46. See R sTATEmENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934).
47. 17 C.F.R. S240.10b-5 (1971).
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Litigation has demonstrated that the language of the Rule can be used
to support an argument both for and against a scienter standard.48 The

words "to defraud" in clause (a) and "operate as a fraud" in clause (c)
seem to indicate that some form of scienter is necessary, but there is
no such portent contained in clause (b). The problem here is whether
these clauses are mutually exclusive or are to be read together. Neither
the courts requiring nor those rejecting a scienter standard have bothered
to distinguish the three clauses of Rule lOb-5, and most courts do not
even mention wich clause is the basis for their decisions.49 The majority
of textbook writers, however, feel that because of the obvious differences in the language of the clauses, distinctions should be drawn between them for scienter purposes.50 The Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the position that the clauses are "mutually supporting
rather than mutually exclusive." 51
Based on the courts' treatment of the Rule, it appears that the clauses
are usually read together-wich leads to the conclusion that some kind
of scienter standard will be necessary 52 This conclusion is bolstered by
the fact that most courts reject any kind of absolute liability doctrine
in securities fraud cases, although there is dicta wich indicates that
53
clause (b) suggests such a strict standard.
48. See notes 70-117 infra and accompanying text.
49. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co, 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1954).
50. See generally Note, Rule lOb-S: Elements of a Private Right of Action, 43
N.Y.U.L. REv. 541 (1968).
51. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SE.C. 907, 913 (1961). For an opposing view, see
generally Meisenholder, supra note 37; Note, supra note 50.
52. One author reaches the conclusion that the scienter standard should be the same
for all three clauses. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 492.
53. In Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co, 187 F. Supp. 14, 23 (W.D.
Ky 1960), it was stated: "A plaintiff purchaser need only prove that a statement in a
prospectus or oral commumcation is in fact false or is a misleading omission and that
he did not know of such untruth or omission.'
Meisenholder has explaned the relaton of clauses (1), (2), and (3) thuslyIn cases which involve untruths or half-truths, Clause (2) clearly applies.
However, m every such case it is possible to regard Clause (1)as applicable
because a "device" or "artifice" is involved. Likewise the use of the untruth or half-truth could conceivably constitute an "act" or "practice" under
Clause (3). Even in cases in which there is a duty to disclose although
no affiative statements have been made, it is possible to regard Clauses
(1)and (3) as having at least the same area of operation as Clause (2).
To the extent that all three clauses have the same area of operation, it appears
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2. Section 10(b)
Section 10(b) is also devoid of any specific language requiring sclenter. It provides in pertinent part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
appropriate in the
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 54
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule 1ob-5, as any other regulation, must be within the scope of
its relative enabling statute in order to establish its validity 5 Professor
Loss has commented that Rule 1Ob-5 is subject therefore to the language
of section 10(b) with regard to "manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance." " He emphasizes the word "manipulative" in reaching
the conclusion that section 10(b) requires scienter.17 Since Rule lob-5
depends for its validity on section 10(b), it must also require scienter
or be void. 58 Professor Melsenholder, another commentator who has
considered this problem, focuses on the word "deceptive," 59 which he
feels reaches the same result as Loss' analysis utilizing the word "manipulative." Thus, Meisenholder concludes that section 10(b) requires at
least some form of scienter. "° But, the language of section 10(b) regarding "any manipulative or deceptive device" raises the inference that
this section may proscribe any deceptive conduct, whether intentional or
not.61 The plain language of the statute, as with Rule 1Ob-5, therefore,
reasonable to conclude that requirements of scienter should be the same
under each clause.
Meisenholder, supra note 37, at 41.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).

55. Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1960).
56. 6 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 3884.
57. Id.
58. Another author notes the same argument but does not reach a conclusion which
might invalidate a "no-scienter rule." Epstein, supra note 4, at 492.
59. Melsenholder, supra note 37
60. Id. at 37
61. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961)
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provides no definte guideline for determining whether scienter is required. The courts have thereby been forced to look to other areas,
such as Congressional intent, in order to interpret section 10(b).2
3

Statutory Tort

The majority of courts which have found that Rule 10b-5 sanctions
an implied civil remedy base their decisions on a statutory tort theory,
among others.13 Such a theory states that the violation of a cnrmnal
statute gives rise to civil liability 4 Rule 10b-5 does not provide
criminal sanctions for violations of its proscriptions; however, sec-

tion 32 of the 1934 Exchange Act

5

declares criminal any willful
violation of the Act or any of its rules. Therefore, it would seem reasonable that courts should find civil liability attaching under a statutory
tort theory only upon a willful violation of Rule lOb-5. 6 The courts
62. One writer has convincingly argued that Congress never intended a private remedy
under section 10(b), and therefore, it would be illogical to inspect Congressional intent
as an aid to determining the proper scienter requirement of a 10b-5 private action.
Ruder, supranote 4.
63. The courts base the statutory tort theory on RESrATEMENT OF ToRTs § 286 (1934).
64. The court in Kardon v. National Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
stated:
Of course, the legislature may withhold from the parties injured the right
to recover damages arising by reason of violation of a statute but the right
is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law that where it is not
expressly demed the intention to withhold it should appear very clearly
and plainly.
For a general discussion of the statutory tort theory see A. BROMsRG, supra note 3,
§ 2.4(1) (a). Professor Bromberg raises the point that section 286 of the Restatement
has been rewritten since the 1934 revision. Revised section 286 provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation
whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest
is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted,
and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the
harm results.
RESTATEMENT (SzcoiD) OF TORTS 1 286 (1965). The 1965 revision allows courts to base
an implied remedy on a violation of a statute. This language does not as readily support
iob-5 liability as the original 1934 version relied on by early 10b-5 courts.
65. 15 US.C. § 78(a) etseq. (1970).
66. Professor Ruder finds it difficult to comprehend how courts have used the tort
theory as a basis for a lob-5 private remedy and then allowed claims based on negligence
alone. He states:
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employ a judicially implied civil liability based on a statutory tort theory
which obviously requires scienter.67 However, in determining what
degree of scienter, if any, is required, the courts often completely
ignore section 32 and look instead to the language of Rule IOb-5 Seizing on the word "any" contained in the Rule, some courts conclude
68
that no scienter need be shown.
It is a well recognized rule of statutory construction that when varyIng interpretations of a statute are possible, the interpretation to be
chosen is that which gives effect to the entire statute, rather than to
only one part. With this in mind, is it valid for courts to look to Rule
10b-5 in determining a scienter standard under a statutory tort theory
and thus effectively nullify section 32? This is not meant to imply that
a definite scienter standard of willfulness should be required in a lob-5
action, but if courts are going to base their decisions solely on a statutory tort theory, some kind of scienter standard would appear to be a
necessary concomitant.6

Case Discussion of Scienter in 10b-5 Actions
In considering the bases for a scienter requirement in a private action
under 10b-5, courts have aligned themselves behind three distinct standards: knowledge of falsity, absolute liability, and negligence. 7
It is difficult to perceive how an action relating to the use of manipulative
and deceptive devices and contrivances in the purchase and sale of stock
which, before the passage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts was founded upon the
law of fraud and deceit, or upon concepts relating to breach of fiduciary
duty, can, by passage of those Acts and subsequent promulgation of Rule
i0b-5, be converted into an action in negligence. It may be that the theory is
entirely inapplicable, and that the courts have been erroneous in applying
it to cases dealing with the Rule.
Ruder, supranote 4, at 632-33.
67. The courts have maneuvered around a requirement of willfulness in some cases by
defining recklessness, or merely negligence, in the failure to ascertain the truth as a form
of willfulness, but this does not comport with common law definition. Comment, Negligent MisrepresentationsUnder Rule 10b-5, 32 CHI. L. REv. 824, 838 (1964).
68. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v. Armbrust,
284 F.2d 670 (9th Cit. 1960).
69. Contra, Note, Scienter in Rule 10b-5, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 1057, 1062-63 (1969).
See also Epstein, supra note 4, at 496. The author recognizes the same analysis but feels
that in view of court definitions of willfulness that to require such would simply be a
requirement of negligence. Although there are such decisions, it is subrmtted that they
are inapplicable within the framework of a statutory tort basis for a private right of
action.
70. For the purposes of the following discussion, scienter is defined as willful or
knowing conduct.
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1. Knowledge of Falsity
The first case which discussed the necessity of scienter was Fischman
v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co. 71 In Fischman, the plaintiffs claimed
that due to material omissions and fraudulent misstatements in a prospectus and registration statement covering preferred stock, they were
induced to buy common stock in defendant company The action was
brought on a section 10(b) and Rule 1ob-5 theory, but the district court
dismissed on grounds that the action was within the exclusive province
of section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act. On appeal, Judge Frank, in
attempting to reconcile the scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5 with
that of section 11, held:
[W]hen, to conduct actionable under [section] 11 of the 1933
Act, there is added the ingredient of fraud, then the conduct be-comes actionable under [section] 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
the Rule..

72

Thiele v. Shields7 3 a later district court case, clarified the scienter
requirement of Fischman. The court specifically held that purely negligent action would not be actionable under 10b-5 74 and went on to
state that knowing or intentional misrepresentation would be required.
Similarly, in Weber v. C.M.P Corp.75 the district court interpreted
Judge Frank's "fraud" requirement as "knowledge of the falsity of the
alleged untrue statements." 7"

Although Fischman77 remains essentially undisturbed in the Second
Circuit,78 it has been followed by only one other court, a district court
71. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
72. Id. at 787
73. 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
74. Id. at 419.
75. 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The court went on to follow Fischman,
although it questioned that case's rationale.
76. Id. at 323. The definition of fraud as made by the Weber court is in agreement
with the interpretation given by most courts and authorities. See, e.g., R. JENMNGS &
H. MARsiT, SrcuRmEs REGuLATIo. CASES AND MATERuALS 866-67 (2d ed. 1968); Comment, Securities Regulation-Fraudrn Securities Transactions and Rule lob-S-A Survey
of Selected CurrentProblems,46 N.C._. REv. 599, 623-25 (1968).
77. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
78. The rationale of Fischman requiring fraud in a private damage action remains
intact in the Second Circuit. Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill and Co, Inc, 448 F.2d
442 (2d Cir. 1971). SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. has, however, eliminated any
scienter requirement for injunctive or prophylactic relief, whether private or by the
SEC.
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in Colorado. In Trussel v. Unted Underwriters, Ltd.,9 the plaintiffs
as purchaser of stock, sought damages. Five separate claims were made,
all alleging violation of Rule lOb-5 Of these, the first count merely
accounted the misstatements and omissions, the second claim incorporated the first and further alleged knowing or intentional conduct,
the fourth incorporated claim one and also alleged negligence, and the
fifth also incorporated claim one and alleged knowing or intentional
conduct.80 The first and fourth claims were summarily dismissed, the
court holding that the language of section 10(b) regarding "'manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance,' 81 implies conduct which is,
at the very least, either knowing or intentional." 82
2. Absolute Liability
Perhaps the leading case cited as authority for the elimination of a
scienter requirement is Ellis v. Carter8 3 Therein, the purchaser alleged
that defendant falsely represented to him that he would obtain a voice
in management with the stock he was buying. Soon thereafter, defendants assumed control of the company and excluded plaintiff. The
Ninth Circuit rejected the idea that Rule 10b-5 does not extend relief
to all defrauded buyers."4 In rejecting this contention, the court held
that proof of common law fraud is not essential to a 1Ob-5 cause of
action. In rejecting Professor Loss' argument s5 that scienter was re79. 228 F Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964) For an in depth analysis of Trussell, see Note,
Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under S.E.C. Anti-Fraud Rule lOb-5, 63
Mici. L. REv.1070 (1965).
80. 228 F Supp. at 761-62.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970)
82. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which includes the district of
Colorado, held contra in Stevens v. Vowel, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965), stating:
It is not necessary to allege or prove common law fraud to make out a case
under the statute and the rule. It is only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions such as the material misstatement of fact or the omission to
state a material fact.
343 F.2d at 379.
In Parker v. Baltimore Paint and Chemical Corp., 244 F Supp. 267 (D. Colo. 1965),
the district court distinguished Stevens on the facts and held the above quote to be
merely dictum. In a recent case it appears that the district court has still not yielded
to the court of appeals, requiring a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's misstatements
or omissions were "fraudulently deceptive." deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 300 F
Supp. 834 (D. Colo. 1969).
83. 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961)
84. In this respect, Ellis agreed with the rationale of Fiscbhnan.
85. It is interesting to note that Professor Loss raised his own argument for the defendants in the Ellis decision. 6 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 3886.
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quired due to the presence of the "manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance" language, the court emphasized the word any in the phrase
"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." 86
It would have been difficult to frame the authority in broader
terms.
We see no reason to go beyond the plain meaning of
the word "any" indicating that the use of manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance of whatever kind may be forbidden, to
construe the statute as if it read "any fraudulent or deceptive"
87
device.
This language supports the contention that even innocent misrepresentations may be actionable under the Rule, and several writers have indeed
construed Ellis m this way"'-although the Ninth Circuit has not so
held in any case to date.
Ellis stands in much the same position as does the Fiscbman case.
Little judicial acceptance has been accorded it, although several courts
have approved of the Ninth Circuit position on scienter by way of
dictum. 9 However, a few decisions have explicitly followed Ellis. In
one which has, Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp.1° the court stated,
"The reasoning of the court in Ellis v. Carter
is particularly persuasive and is adopted by this court." 91
Several courts have indicated, without actually deciding, that liability might attach for non-negligent and unmtentional misrepresentauons. 9 2 In Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith 93 this broad dictum is
found:
86. 13 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
87. 291 F.2d at 274. Professor Loss has responded:
But one gags at stretching 10(b)'s "manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance" to cover any material misstatement or onussion on a strict
liability basis-the more so since, except for the issuer's liability under
section 11 of the 1933 act, none of the express civil liability provisions with
respect to misstatements or omissions in either act goes that far.
6 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 3887
88. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 8.9 n.102; R. JENiNGs & H. MARsM, supra note 76,
at 866-67
89. Kohler v Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963); Lorenz v. Watson, 258
F Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
90. 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962).
91. Id. at 469.
92. Texas Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co, 187 F Supp. 14 (WD Ky 1960).
93. 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
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[CIommon law fraud need not be alleged or ultimately proved.
Plaintiff is only required to prove a material misstatement or
an omission of a material fact in connection with 9the
purchase or
4
sale of any security to make out a prima facie case.
3. Negligence
The third position taken by the courts on the issue of scienter is found
in Drake v. Thor Power Tool CoY5 Therein, Drake alleged that he
purchased stock in reliance on false figures in defendant's financial statements, and that defendant accounting firm was negligent in conducting
their audit of Thor and in giving the financial statements their approval.
Defendant contended that knowledge is a necessary element in a 10b-5
suit, but the Illinois district court rejected both this argument and the
position urged in Ellis."6 It determined that allegations of an improper
audit constituted a charge of negligence.9 7 The court held that negligent
as well as intentional misrepresentations fall within the scope of Rule

lOb-5

98

The Second Circuit, notwithstanding its earlier Fischman-ThieleWeber doctrine, decided in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.9 9 that a
scienter standard equal to a specific intent to defraud was unnecessary
for an SEC action. The majority concluded that a decision holding
negligence to be actionable under lob-5 was
not
irreconcilable with previous language in this circuit because "some form of the traditional scienter requirement"
is
preserved. The requirement, whether it be termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud or unreasonable or negligent conduct,
remains implicit in this standard, a standard that promotes the deterrence objective of the Rule.' °°
While deciding that negligence is actionable under 10b-5, the court
failed to confront the argument that a relaxation of the scienter requirement would allow actions which are expressly covered by sections 11
and 12 of the 1933 Act to be brought under lob-5 101 The court also
94. Id. at 212.

95.
96.
97.
98.

282 F Supp. 94 (N.D. IMI.1967).
Id. at 102.
Id. at 104.
Id.

99. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)

100. Id. at 855.
101. See Note, supra note 68, at 1064.
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failed to give weight to the fact that the defendants would be liable
under the strict scienter requirement espoused by the cases cited in

support of its position. 10 2 In light of the existing Fischman rationale,
the broad language of the court indicates that a major relaxation of the
scienter requirement was intended.
The court was quick to point out, however, that their holding extended only to an action for injunctive relief. 10 3 In a concurring opinion, Judge Friendly urged the court to make their distinction quite clear

in order to provide guidance to lower courts m the multiplicity of
private damage suits pending at the time which also might involve allegations of negligence 0 4
Texas Gulf raises questions about the status of scienter in the Second
Circuit. In Fischman, the court required an "ingredient of fraud" 105
in a 10b-5 suit, and in Texas Gulf it was claimed that its negligence test
did not vitate Fischman, but was just another form of fraud.106 Certainly the negligence standard in Texas Gulf, if applied to private actions, considerably dilutes the requirements of Fischman and departs
from the court's previous decision. Even more confusing is the declaration in Texas Gulf that good faith will be a defense to a private action
07
instituted under lOb-5 for misrepresentation.
One thing is certain-Texas Gulf Sulphur gives no positive solution
to the scienter problem and it has left a wake of confusion in the Second
Circuit. This is apparent in the later cases which have attempted an

interpretation of Texas Gulf. In Wellington Computer Graphics,Inc.
v. Modell,10 8 a proceeding on defendant's motion for stay of federal
action for alleged violation of federal securities laws, the court, citing

Texas Gulf and Ellis v. Carter,held:
[T] he elements necessary to establish common law fraud differ
from those essential to prove a violation of the federal secunties
law Proof of a specific intent to defraud or scienter is an essential element of common law fraud, but scienter is not essential to
establish a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 where it is
102. Id.
103. 401 F.2d at 863.

104. Id.at 866.

105. 188 F.2d at 787

106. 421,F.2d at 855.

107. Id.at 862.
108. 315 F Supp. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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sufficient merely to show "lack of diligence, constructive fraud,
or unreasonable or negligent conduct." 109
In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,"1 a derivative action for an accounting and restitution, the court, citing Texas Gulf, required scienter,
stating "In this Circuit it appears that in a private action some type of
scienter as distinguished from mere negligence is still necessary under
Rule 10b-5 " 111 The inconsistency in these two decisions is apparent.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the same court which
decided Texas Gulf, struck a blow at the confusion surrounding scienter
m that circuit by its recent decision in Shemtob v. Shearson, Hanmmill
and Co., Inc." 2 The case involved a damage suit against a broker-dealer,
alleging that he did not sell out a margin account promptly after an
unmet margin call, as required by a written contract, and that the sellout eventually occurred without further notice and opportumty to
meet the margin as orally agreed upon. The court held that these allegations constituted only a "garden-variety customer's suit," 113 insufficient for a 1ob-5 action.
[I]n the absence of allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use
of a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. It is insufficient to allege
4
mere negligence."
In Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.,"5 a later district court
case (not citing Shemtob), it was held that "10b of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, upon which plaintiff primarily
relies, requires findings of
scienter.
,, 11" The court went on to
say that a plaintiff must prove scienter, "whether this is to be interpreted as 'actual knowledge of falsity,'
or recklessness equivalent
to willful fraud.
" "'
Thus it appears that the Second Circuit has resolved the scienter

problem on the basis of the relief sought. If the suit is for munctive
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 26.
298 F Supp. 66 (ED.N.Y. 1969).
Id. at 97
448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
Id. at 445.

id.
CCH [1970-71 Transfer Binder]
Id. at 91, 384-85.
Id. at 91, 385.

FED. SEc. L.

REP.

93,219 (S.D.N.Y 1971)
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or prophylactic relief, an allegation of negligence is sufficient to defeat
a motion to dismiss. But in a private action for damages, plaintiff must
allege facts amounting to scienter or fraud.
Conclusion
Scienter represents the most confused element of a section 10(b),
Rule lob-5 cause of action. The courts are widely dispersed among
such positions as absolute liability (Ninth Circuit),""8 negligence (Seventh Circuit)," x9 and a combination of both negligence and scienter in
the confused Second Circuit.

20

A strict scienter standard, although the easiest to administer from an
evidentiary standpoint in relation to other 10b-5 elements, is least effective in achievmg the purpose of the 1934 Act and its egalitarian
concept of total investor equality. An absolute liability standard, although most effectively carrying out the purpose of the 1934 Exchange
Act, would provide added impetus to the almost complete displacement
effect of Rule IOb-5 on the express anti-fraud provisions of both securities acts.'

21

Perhaps the best method would be a continuum approach which
would vary from absolute liability to negligence to willful conduct
depending on the relative positions of the parties and their access to
material information. This method would continue the case-by-case
analysis, but is perhaps most effective in realizing the purpose of the
1934 Act.'22
MATERIALITY

Common Law
At common law any person making a material misrepresentation in
conjunction with the consequent elements of reliance, causation, scienter, and privity, was liable in tort for deceit.2 3 Common law, how118. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).

119. Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. M. 1967).
120. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
121. See notes 439-75 infra and accompanying text.
122. Mann, Rule. lOb-5. Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch
Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1206 (1970)
123. See, e.g., McKay v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 199 S.C. 335, 79 S.E.2d 457 (1942). The
RESTaEsm N OF TORTS § 525 (1938) reiterates the common action providing:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, mtention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from
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ever, did not as a general rule require a person in possession of a material
fact to disclose the same in any purchase or sale. 12 4 As an exception to
the rule, the concept of fiduciary duty 2 5 required anyone in such a
relationshup to disclose any material fact in a transaction involving his
prncipal. 2 6 A majority of early common law courts found that a
fiduciary relation existed between corporation officers or insiders and
their corporation, but not between the insider and the stockholder of
his corporation. 2 7 Corporation insiders were then left free to purchase
shares from their own stockholders without disclosing material inside
information which formed the basis for their purchases. The inequities
of the majority rulings128 prompted a minority of jurisdictions, spearheaded by Oliver v. Oliver'2 9 to extend the fiduciary relation to the
30
interrelationship of corporate officer and stockholders.

Dissatisfaction with the results evolving from both the majority and
minority rule 131 led to the creation of an intermediary doctrine involv-

ing the elements of both, known as the special fact doctrine. 3 2 The
Supreme Court in Strong v. Repide133 held that the existence of special
action i reliance thereon in a business transaction is liable to the other for
the harm caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.
124. See, e.g., Windfram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N.E.
454 (1921); Boileau v. Records & Breen, 165 Iowa 134, 144 N.W 336 (1913); W PROSSEE,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 695-99 (4th ed. 1971)
125. For a discussion of the fiduciary duty concept as applied in securities see
Nielson, So What Else Is New In The Laq? Texas Gulf Sulphur Restates Peek v. Gurney,
1971 UTAH L. REv. 327, 328-48.
126. McDonough v. Williams, 77 Ark. 261, 92 S.W 783 (1905)
127. In Smith v. Hurd the court stated:
There is no legal privity, relation, or immediate connection, between holders
of shares in a bank, in their individual capacity, on the one side, and the
direction of the bank on the other. The directors are not the bailees, the
factors, agents, or trustees of such individual stockholders.
53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371, 384 (1847) See also Conant, Dutes of Disclosure of Corporate
Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960)
128. In Bd. of Commissioners v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 15 Am. R. 245 (1873), a corporate
insider acquired stock for $27,000, actually worth $342,000, through non-disclosure of
future merger plans.
129. 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
130. 45 S.E. at 233.
131. The fiduciary relation was often analogized to the trustee-cestui que trust with
often inequitable results. See Note, Insiders and Materiality of Information Disclosed,
18 Am. UJ.. REv. 427, 431 (1969).
132. The majority of courts view the special facts doctrine as a rule of full disclosure.
E.g., Amen v. Black, 234 F.2d 12 (10th Cir. 1956); Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d
389 (6th Cir. 1954); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947)
133. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).

1972]

SEC RULE 1Ob-5

facts, such as the defendant's position as an insider, required a full disclosure of material facts rather than the finding of any fiduciary duty
between the officer and the stockholder.'4
Rule lOb-5 (b) ,'15 promulgated under section 10 (b) 3 has adopted the
common law prohibition of affirmative material misrepresentation and
extended the common law disclosure requirements. Since a civil remedy
was first inplied by Kardon v. National Gypsum, 3 7 it has been firmly
established that liability exists under lob-5 for the failure to disclose
38
material inside information.1
The questions concerning proscribed conduct and extent of liability
are, therefore, essentially moot in most situations. The most important
question for courts reviewing lob-5 claims is then, "Was defendant's
misleading statement material?" 139
Statutory and Regulatory Criteria:Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Courts looking for some statutory aid in developing a proper definiton of materiality have experienced little success. Section 10(b) 140 is
devoid of any mention of "material," only prohibiting the use of "any
manipulative or descriptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules" 141 as the SEC might promulgate to enforce the section.
Rule 10b-51'42 lays out the specific requirement of materiality for a
violation of its proscribed conduct in clause (b), but furnishes no guidelines for an interpretation of the requirement 43 Clause (b) does, however, provide a limit on any determination of materiality by requiring
any finding to be made "in the light of the circumstances under which
the misleading statement was made." 144

The only definition of materiality found in the statutes or official
rules of the SEC is located in Rule 405 of Regulation C under the 1933
Act. 45 The definition provides:
134. 213 U.S. at 432-35.
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).
137. 73 F Supp. 798 (ED. Pa. 1947).
138. See Comment, Insider Liabilities Examined, 18 Sya. L. REv. 808, 816 (1967).
139. See, e.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 459 (2d Cir. 1968);
Richland v. Crandall, 262 F Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
141. Id.
142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1971).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1971).
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The term 'material', when used to qualify a requirement for the
furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information
required to those matters as to which an average prudent investor
ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the security
registered. 146
This definition has, however, received slight judicial cognizance in 1Ob-5
actions.

147

Case Discussion of Materiality
Finding no relevant statutory or regulatory guidelines in forming a
definition of materiality, the courts have been forced to look to common
law Materiality represents the only element of common law fraud
which has been incorporated basically unchanged into Rule lob-5 148
The rationale behind the common law requirement of materiality was
to prevent a purchaser or seller from avoiding a bad deal, by clamung
reliance on any misleading statement by the other party to the transaction.149 In order to prevent such occurrences, the courts implemented
a reasonable man test,1 0 thus requiring not only that the plaintiff must
have relied on the misrepresentation, but his reliance must also have
been justifiable.' 5'
Although the courts in concert pay lip service to the requirement of
materiality, confusion has surrounded court pronouncements of the
proper test. Materiality has been most clearly delineated In the more
subtle cases, almost always those involving non-disclosure, with the
courts using various formulae to reach a result essentially equivalent to
the common law reasonable man test. 83 In Kardon v. National Gyp146. Id.
147. The definition of materiality included in the rule has not been explicitly followed
even by the SEC. In Cady, Roberts and Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), the Commission
defined material facts as those "which if known would affect the investment judgment
of the person with whom the insider deals." Id. at 911.
148. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965)
149. Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentation, 2 OKLA. L. REv. 56, 59 (1949).
150. See Babb v. Bolyard, 194 Md. 603, 72 A.2d 13 (1950).
151. In List the court cautions that the requirement that the plaintiffs reliance be
justifiable should be distinguished from the common law requirement that a reasonable
man would have believed the rmsleading statement. The court finds that such requirement may not exist at all under Rule 10b-5. 340 F.2d 457, 462 n.3. (2d Cir. 1965).
152. Dykstra, The Battle Grounds of lOb-S, 1971 UTAH L. Rxv. 297, 304.
153. The common law materiality test as stated m the REsTATEMENT oT ToRTs § 538
(1938) provides:
(1) Reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact m a business
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sumi5 4 the court held that the defendant, a majority stockholder, should
have disclosed his negotiations for sale of the corporate assets before
purchasing more stock in the corporation, stating: "Insiders must disclose a fact coming to their knowledge by reason of their position which
would materially affect the judgment of the other party to the transaction." 15 Materiality was defined in Kohler v. Kohleri5" as any fact
"which would, in reasonable anticipation, affect the other party's judgment." 157 The common law definition was specifically adopted by the
Second Circuit, in List v. FashionPark, Inc., 5 " where the court, citing
Professor Prosser and the Restatement of Torts, held:
The basic test of "materiality," on the other hand, is whether "a
reasonable man would attach importance to the fact misrepresented
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question." 159
Although the courts are in agreement that the misleading statements
in question must be subjected to a reasonable man test, a review of the

language in recent decisions indicates that the materiality concept may
have been extended. It is essential that some degree of probability be
shown indicating that a reasonable investor would have acted differently
in the transaction at hand. 160 At common law and in the List test this
degree of probability is measured by the word "would." 11 In the subtransaction is justifiable if, but only if, the fact misrepresented is material.
(2) A fact is material if
(a) its existence or nonexistence is a matter to which a reasonable man
would attach importance in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question, or
(b) the maker of the representation knows that its recipient is likely to
regard the fact as important although a reasonable man would not so
regard it.
(3) The recipient in a business transaction of a fraudulent misrepresentation of a material fact is justified in relying upon it whether or not he
believes the maker to have an antagonistic interest in the transaction.
154. 73 F Supp. 798 (ED. Pa. 1947).
155. Id. at 800.
156. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
157. Id. at 642.
158. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
159. Id. at 462.
160. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 569 (ED.
N.Y. 1971).
161. See RESTATEmENT OF ToRTs 5 538 (1938).
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sequent landmark decision, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,162 the court
cited both the List and Kohler tests, but in summation substituted the
word "may," holdingThus material facts include not only information disclosing the
earning and distributions of a company but also those facts which
affect the probable future of the company and those which may
affect the desire of investors to buy or sell, or hold the company's
secunties 63s [Emphasis supplied.]
In addition, Texas Gulf extended the concept of a reasonable investor
by including under the protection of Iob-5 the reasonable speculator or
chartst.164
The Supreme Court, discussing "material" as applied to proxy violations under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act," 5 held in Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lte 66 that a finding of materiality "indubitably embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it might have been
considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the
process of deciding how to vote." 107 In a later Second Circuit case,
Chasms v. Smith, Barney and Co., 16 8 the Court cited List and Kohler
in concluding that the question of materiality "becomes whether a rea" 19
sonable man in Chasms' position might 'well have acted otherwise.
Tis possible trend was recognized in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp.'70 The court in Feit found that a fair summary of the
current status of the probability requirement would find a fact material
when "it is more probable than not that a significant number of traders
would have wanted to know it before deciding to deal in the
" 171
security
162. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
163. Id. at 849.
164. id.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)
166. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
167. 396 U.S. at 384. [Emphasis supplied].
168. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
169. Id. at 1171. [Emphasis supplied).
170. 332 F Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).

171. Id. at 570.

1972)

s1c
EL

E lOb-5

Conclusion
Although courts have been confused in their formulations of a matenality test, 172 materiality still represents the least confused of the elements of a lob-5 implied action. However, if the language of recent
decisions is liberally construed, a trend toward the expansion of materiality may be in progress. The logical result of such a trend would
further the courts' current tendency to accept any affirmative misrepresentaton as material,1 73 and require insiders to disclose all or forego
any dealings in their corporation's stock. Coupled with a no scienter
standard, such as the Ninth Circuit employs, 7 4 insiders would then be
liable for almost any non-disclosure, regardless of due diligence exerted
to determine what facts should be disclosed.
RELiANCE

There is no language in Rule lob-5 which suggests the necessity for
a defrauded plaintiff to prove reliance.' 7 5 Things are not this simple,
however, because reliance is an integral part of the scheme of implied
liability which has evolved outside of the strict construction of the
Rule. It is also, of course, an element of the classic fraud case, in which
the plaintiff must prove reliance upon the misrepresentation in order to
recover.

76

Although courts often say that reliance by the defrauded party is
essential for recovery under 10b-5, 77 this is not a hard and fast rule,
and the requirement has been treated with a great deal of flexibility
This is especially true in those instances in which reliance is particularly
172. Bromberg favors a substantial market impact test over the reasonable investor
test laid out in Texas Gulf. A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 7.4(3) (b) - (h).
173. The majority of courts considering affirmative misrepresentation claims under
lob-5 fail to analyze the materiality tests, merely finding the misrepresentation material.
See, e.g, SEC v. Broadwall Securities, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962 (1965).
174. See discussion of Ellis v. Carter m text accompanying notes 83-88 supra.
175. Section 12 (2) of the 1933 Act which expressly provides for a private right of
action also contains no language requiring reliance. See Trussell v. United Underwriters,
Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
176. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 536, 538 (1938).
177. See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266-68 (1st Cir. 1966); Janigan
v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 785-86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), caert. demed, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). But see
Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1967) (reliance is "unnecessary
in the limited instance where no volitional act is required and the result of a forced
sale is exactly that intended by the wrongdoers:").
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difficult to prove, as in non-disclosure cases 178 or where large numbers
of persons are rnvolved. 79 In some cases reliance has been neglected,
rejected, or watered down, depending on the sitUation. 1' °
The end result has been a constant process of blending and slufting
so that reliance has become almost indistinguishable from causation and
difficult to discern relative to materiality 181 The three elements have
become at least partially interchangeable, and combinations of one or
two of them seem to be sufficient in different cases to defeat a motion
to distrss.'2 The required proof of reliance also seems to depend on
whether the case involves nondisclosure or active misrepresentation.

Non-disclosure
There seems to be scant rationale for requiring reliance in nondisclosure cases. One district court required active reliance on the defendant's silence, 8 3 but this test was rejected by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals when it affirmed the finding of non-reliance, holding, "[T] he proper test in a nondisclosure situation is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the
defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact." 184
178. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir.
1969); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. demed, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964) (noted the
distinction between lob-5(2) requiring a showing of reliance not required under
section 12 (2) of the 1933 Act).
179. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 US. 375 (1970).
180. See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cit. 1967);
Entel v. Allen, 270 F Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco
Co., 241 F Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965); Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F
Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
181. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio and Television Corp., 99 F Supp. 701, 706-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952), was the first case to
require privity, but the court suggested reliance would be an acceptable substitute. The
dissent on appeal indicates that if the defendants intended that the plaintiff rely on
their misstatements privity would be unnecessary 198 F.2d at 885.
182. The need for such reliance by a plaintiff has been the subject of much scholarly
analysis. See, e.g., Painter, Insider Information: Growing Pains for the Development of
Federal Corporation Law Under Rule l0b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1366-72 (1965);
Note, Civil Liability Under Section lob and Rule lob-5: A Suggestion for Replacing
the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YAE L.J. 658, 667-74 (1965).
183. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F Supp. 906, 911-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
184. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965).
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List v. Fashion Park, Inc." s ' involved a sale of securities to an insider
and a claim that the insider had failed to disclose material facts to the
seller. The plaintiff seller sued the buyer on a 10b-5 theory, alleging
deception by means of failure to disclose. The court held that even
were there material misrepresentations through nondisclosure, nevertheless the plaintiff could not recover under the Rule since it had failed to
establish reliance upon the facts represented. Thus, reliance upon the
misrepresentation was held to be an essential element of a lob-5 claim.
Included in the requirements for a section 10(b) cause of action is what
element of tort law . the
the List court described as that "basic
principle of causation in fact." '86
The test elicited from List suggests that reliance must be shown in
a 10(b) case in order to establish causation and materiality The court
first drew a distmction between the common law elements of materiality and reliance and concluded that the reason for the reliance requirement is to show that the defendant actually caused the plaintiff's

injury*
Insofar as is pertinent here, the test of "reliance" is whether "the
misrepresentaton is a substantial factor in determinng the course
The reason
of conduct which results in the recipient's loss."
for this requirement, as explained by the authorities cited, is to
certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff's injury 187

The test for materiality, on the other hand, is whether "a reasonable
man would attach importance to the fact misrepresented in determining
his choice of action in the transaction in question." 188 The List holding
therefore retains the common law distinction between "reliance" and
"materiality" in a lOb-5 action by substituting the individual plaintiff
for the reasonable man.'9
In rejecting the idea that reliance should be discarded, the Second
Circuit went on to sayAssuredly, to abandon the requirement of reliance would be to
facilitate outsiders' proof of insiders' fraud, and to that extent the
185.
186.
1951);
187.

340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
Id. at 463. See also Speed v. Transamenca Corp, 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.

Kardon v. Natnonal Gypsum Co, 73 F Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
340 F.2d at 462.

188. Id.
189. ld. at 463.
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interpretation for which plaintiff contends might advance the
purposes of Rule lob-5. But this strikes us as an inadequate reason
for reading out of the rule so basic an element of tort law as the
principle of causation in fact. 90
The List test of reliance is still the most frequently cited authority
for requiring reliance in nondisclosure actions, being held applicable in
private damage actions based on nondisclosure in anonymous stock
exchange transactions,' 9 ' and in direct-dealing non-disclosure cases. 192
There is, however, authority for dispensing with a reliance requirement in cases of nondisclosure. The Second Circuit, in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co 193 held:
Whatever need there may be to show reliance in other situations
, we regard it as unnecessary in the limited instance when no
volitional act is required and the result of a forced sale is exactly
that intended by the wrongdoer. Since the complaint alleges that
plaintiff, in effect, has been forced to divest himself of his stock
and this is what defendants conspired to do, reliance by plaintiff
on the claimed deception need not be shown. What must be shown
is that there was deception which misled Class A stockholders
and that this was in fact the cause of plaintiff's claimed injury 194
In still another Second Circuit case, Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co.' 95 the court cited the List test of reliance, followed by the
exception forwarded in Vine, and summed up by saying, "reliance is
an element of causation which plays little role in non-disclosure cases." 196
From the apparent confusion in the Second Circuit can it fairly be
assumed that if a plaintiff in a nondisclosure case can prove a deception
which caused is claimed injury, no reliance need be shown? Seemingly,
Vine and Crane have altered List, and in the Second Circuit at least, the
answer is yes.
190. Id.
191. Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
192. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634
(7th Cir. 1963).
193. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
194. Id. at 635.
195. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969)
196. Id. at 797
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Misrepresentation
Reliance is a less confused issue in cases of affirmative msrepresentation, particularly if the untrue statements come to the plaintiff's attention. This will occur in person-to-person or other direct transactions.
But Professor Bromberg suggests that if the misstatement does not come
to the plaintiff's attention, as in many open market trades, it is meaningless to demand reliance. 197 He also feels that such a demand would
be unfair, since investors who trade with an eye on market conditions
might be influenced by the misstatement even though he never hears
it.198

Other Theories
As an alternative to the Crane test of reliance, 9 9 there is some judicial
recognition that reliance may be presumed from materiality 20 Bromberg characterizes this presumption as sensible, since once materiality
20
is proved, the reasonably prudent investor can be expected to rely '
The corporate relationship has also been found to support a presumpton of reliance when the plaintiff is a stockholder suing the corporation
or its directors. 02
Proof of Reliance
Cases involving affirmative usrepresentation are particularly susceptible to a production of empty pleading and plaintiff's testimony that
"I relied." 203 In any type of case, however, evidence of plaintiff's conduct is admissible to show that he did not rely 20 4 Bromberg suggests that
197.
198.
199.
200.

A. BROMBERG, supra note 3,-§ 8.6(2).
Id.
The Crane court held that reliance is an element of causation. 419 F.2d at 797
See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382- U.S. 879 (1965);

A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 8.6(2Y.
201. A. BROMBERG, supranote 3, § 8.6(2)
202. Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Co., 241 F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del. 1965).
203. See Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (Ist Cit. 1966), rev'g 250 F Supp.
112 (D. Mass. 1966). The trial court held plaintiff had failed to, prove reliance and
materiality and granted summary judgment for defendants. Although it was concerned
about plaintiff's possible lack of reliance, the court of appeals .reversed.
204. For misrepresentation cases, see, e.g., Mutual' Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,
266 F Supp. 130, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F Supp.'261, 264
(D. Colo. 1965); Nash. v. J. Arthur Warner & Co., Inc, 137 F. Supp. 615 (D. Mass.
1955); Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1955). For cases: ind1wrfg nondisclosure, see, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co, 208 F Supp. 808. (ED.'Pa. 1062), aff'd, 3.19
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materiality and other factors provide standards against which the rea2 5
sonableness of plaintiff's reliance may be measured.

New Decisions Considering Reliance
Several recent decisions in 10b-5 cases have attempted to create some
20 6
order out of the muddied waters of reliance. In Kahan v. Rosenstel,
the Third Circuit held that "[p]roof of reliance is not an independent
element which must be alleged to establish a cause of action." 207 The
court noted the language m Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company,2 8 a
section 14(a) suit, wherein the Supreme Court held that reliance on false
or misleading proxy statements is not required in order to maintain a
14(b) cause of action. 0 9 One of the primary reasons for the Supreme
Court's holding was their belief that "[p]roof of actual reliance by thousands of individuals would
not be feasible
and reliance on the
nondisclosure of a fact is a particularly difficult matter to define or prove.
)7 210 [Emphasis supplied.]
The import of the Kahan opinion takes on added sigificance in light
of the recent Second Circuit opinion in Chasms v. Smith, Barney and
Company 211 There, the court of appeals gave increased support to its
12 that reliance is an element of causation with little
holding in Crane=
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Connelly v. Balkwell, 174 F Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959),
aff'd per c-riam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960).
205. A. BRomBERG;, supra note 3, § 8.6(2). But see Note, suzpra note 182, at 688-89

and Note, supra note 67, at 841-44, which argue that in cases involving negligent misstatements, the plaintiff's reliance must be justifiable.
206. 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970).

207. Id. at 173.
208. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).

209. Justice Harlan wrote for the majority in Mills:
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown
to be "material," as it was found to be here, that determination itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such a character that
it might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who
was in the process of deciding how to vote. This requirement that the
defect have a significant propensity to affect the voting process is found
in the express terms of Rule 14a-9, and it adequately serves the purpose of
ensuring that a cause of action cannot be established by proof of a defect
so trivial, or so unrelated to the transaction for which approval is sought,
that correction of the defect or imposition of liability would not further the
interests protected by § 14(a).
396 U.S. at 384.
210. 396 U.S. at 380, citng the Seventh Circuit at 403 F.2d 429, 436 n.10.
211. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
212. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
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role to play in nondisclosure cases. Chasms involved nondisclosure by
a broker-dealer of his position as market maker to a purchaser of stock
at the time of sale. The court held that the question was not whether
the defendant sold to plaintiff at a fair price, but whether nondisclosure
of defendant's market maker status might have influenced plaintiff's
decision to buy the stock. The court found that a market maker posiuon was a material fact which should have been disclosed; that plaintiff
relied on defendant's advice without disclosure of the material fact;
that plaintiff purchased the stock and suffered a loss on resale; and that
"[c]ausation in fact or adequate reliance was sufficiently shown by
Chasms."2 13 The test of reliance used by the court in Crane was the
basis for the test used in Chasins: "To the extent that reliance is necessary for a finding of a 1Ob-5 violation in a nondisclosure case such as
this, the test is properly one of tort 'causation in fact.' "214
In Gordon v. Lipoff,2 15 the district court noted that the Eighth Circuit follows the List test in requiring both reliance and causation in a
section 10(b)-Rule lob-5 action.2 16 The court cited with approval the
recent holding in the Tenth Circuit case of Reyos v. United States. xT

In Reyos, the court of appeals agreed with the district court's ruling
that the defendants failed to disclose material facts, but reversed because
[I]n the case before us the facts of misrepresentation have been
shown as to several of the transactions. The record, however, does
not contain any evidence relating to reliance by the plaintiffs on
the representations of the defendants Gale and Haslem. This is a
necessary element of the cause alleged.218
The Maryland district court confronted the reliance problem in Johns
Hopkins University v. Hutton,1 9 and noted Judge Winter's decree in
22
' that "most of the authorities require some reliance
Baumel v. Rosen,by the plaintiff upon the data that was furmshed." 21 The court went
on to consider the discussions of reliance contained in List, Crane, Mills,
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

438 F.2d at 1172.
Id., citng.Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
320 F. Supp. 905 (Wi). Mo. 1970).
Id. at 921.
431 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1348.
326 F Supp. 250 (D.Md. 1971).
283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968).
Id. at 140 [Emphasis supplied].
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and Rosenstiel, and the contention that Mills and Rosenstiel have dispensed with the need to prove reliance in a 10 (b) case where materiality
and causation are present. Unfortunately, the court failed to reach this
argument, since it found all three elements present and determined that
the reliance shown exceeded Judge Winter's degree of "some. _22
Conclusion
Since the Second Circuit's decision in List v. Fasbion Park, Inc., the
requirement of reliance has undergone a steady transformation, particularly within that circuit. In List, reliance was held to be distinct from
materiality and necessary to prove causation. However, since the court's
holding in Vine, Crane, and Chasms, reliance is presumed if causation
is present, at least in nondisclosure cases.
To add to the confusion, the First Circuit will presume reliance if
materiality is proved; z2 s the Third Circuit seems to have expressly discarded reliance m nondisclosure situations; but the Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits still adhere to the List test.
In light of the courts' liberal application of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 in securities fraud cases, and the apparent unwillingness to limit
the scope of the section and Rule beyond what is absolutely necessary
to prevent frivolous suits, it is safe to conclude that in non-disclosure
cases reliance is no longer an element which must be alleged and proved
in and of itself. In such cases a showing of causation or materiality or
both will suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss and get the case to the
jury However, courts will probably still require at least some allegation that plaintiff relied on defendant's statements in cases involving
affirmative misrepresentations in direct, person-to-person transactions.
CAUSATION

The rather flexible approach taken by courts in dealing with the reliance requirement extends also to the judicial treatment of causation.
As with reliance, there is no language in Rule 10b-5 demanding proof
of causation, unless such is gleaned from the "in connection with"
phrase. Causation becomes even more, inscrutable when it is realized
222. "In this case, materiality and causation, and reliance in and of itself are independently established by the undisputed facts insofar as the two 10b-5 counts are concerned." 326 F Supp. at 260.
223. See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. dented, 382 U.S. 879 (1969);
A. BROMBERG, supra note 3-, § 8.6(2)

1972]

SEC RULE

10b-5

that very few courts have discussed this element in any detail, quite
possibly because it has been difficult to evaluate what the law is or what
it should be in this area.
It is logical and reasonable to condition private recovery under 10b-5
upon some causal relation between defendant's misconduct and plaintiff's injury, and indeed, courts have so held.224 Professor Bromberg
traces the hazy origins of the requirement 225 from the pronouncements
226
that lob-5 was not promulgated as a scheme of investor's insurance,
to the language of section 28 (a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act:
"[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this Act shall recover
a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of." 227 The concept of
proximate cause is so essential to general tort law that courts have also
frequently grounded recovery in 10b-5 suits upon a showing of that
228

factor.

In view of the indefinite origins from which the causation requirement springs, it is not surprising that the same blending and shading
which confuses reliance also obscures causation. Thus, causation is sometimes merged into reliance, 22 9 materiality, 280 or privity,231 while other
times it is considered a necessary element in and of itself.232 The result
224. See, e.g., Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F Supp. 757, 771 (D. Colo.
1964); Rogers v. Crown Stove Works, 236 F Supp. 572 (ND. Ill. 1964) (while no
express mention of causation was made, the court denied relief to a plaintiff whose
loss was not caused in any substantial way by a l0b-5 violation). Compare W PaossER,
HANDBOOK OF nsa LAw OF TORTS § 41 (3d ed. 1964) vmth the language in. List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), regarding
"so basic an element of tort law as the principle of causation m fact."
225. A. BROMRGa, supra note 3, § 8.7(1).
226. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F Supp. 766 (SD.N.Y. 1965).
227. Section 32 does not apply in non-damage actions, but probably is applicable in
all implied actions.
228. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969);
Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
229. This was the premise in List v'. Fashion Park, Inc., whereto the court said the
reason for requiring reliance is to certify that defendant's actions actually caused plaintiff's loss. 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Ci.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
230. A. BRoEnrG, supra note 3, § 8.7(1).
231. See, e.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio and Television Corp., 99 F Supp. 701,
706-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), af)fd per curnmi, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cit. 1952).
232. See, e.g., Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F Supp. 524, 530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F Supp. 356, 360-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Eagle v. Horvath,
241 F Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 231 (SD.N.Y.
1965); Barnett v. Anaconda Co, 238 F Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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is that it is not clear at all how proximate the causation must be,"'
or whether proximate cause is even required any more.2a4 In addition,
Bromberg notes that courts have adopted a "but for" test of causation
in various cases which may be extended to other factual situations. 2 5
Cases Discussing Causation
One of the first cases to come to grips with the causation question was
Barnett v. Anaconda Co.,sa in which a minority shareholder brought
suit on behalf of the corporation for damages resulting from a sale of
shares by the corporation for a price allegedly below fair market value.
The plaintuff alleged fraudulent and deceptive onmssions in the notice
of the shareholders' meeting at wluch the transaction was to be approved. No allegation was made in support of a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the later ratification of the agreement. The
Barnett decision involved both sections 14(a) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. With respect to section 14(a) the necessity for
causation was strictly construed: "[P] revious decisions
under 14 (a)
emphasize the necessity for causation-that is to say, that the alleged
violation of that section of the statute resulted in the damage claimed." 237
However, the requirement for 10b-5 suits was held to be only "some
causal relationship to the damage complained of." 23 The court in Bar233. The court did not consider this issue m Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F Supp.
766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), but referred to the language in Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 88
(2d Cir. 1956), that a violation permits the injured party to recover "any loss
proximately resulting therefrom." Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F Supp. 356, 360-62
(E.D.N.Y. 1966), frames the test in the less severe term "transactional function."
234. See notes 236-64 mfra.
235. A. BROMBERO, supra note 3, § 8.7(1) See also Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,
374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967). In Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F
Supp. 369, 375-76 (D. Del. 1965), the court said:
In Barnett
relief under Rule 10b-5 was denied because the plaintiff
failed to show a causal relationship between the fraud alleged and the injury
claimed. The present Complaint discloses no such infirmity The frauds
alleged [e.g., nondisclosure of true value factors in a tender offer aggregating
enough stock to permit a short form merger in which minority shareholders
would receive cash] culrmnated in the merger
under which plaintiff became obligated to sell her stock at $17 per share, when, according to the
Complaint, it was worth substantially more. This would not have occurred
m the absence of the frauds.
For a case which rejected on public policy grounds the requirement that causation be
proved, see Weber v. Bartle, 272 F Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
236. 238 F Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
237. Id. at 772.
238. Id. at 775 [Emphasis supplied].
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7ett expressly refused to decide whether the causal connection required
must rise to the level of proximate causation,2i 9 since no causal connection whatsoever had been alleged. 240
In 1967, the same court that decided Barnett again considered the
causation problem in Globus v. Jaroff,241 where it was alleged that stockholder approval of a transaction, necessary under state law, would not
have been given but for misleading proxy statements. The court reaffirmed its language in Barnett, 42 and stated in connection with the allegations of the complaint:
Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the issued and outstanding
shares would not have been obtainable without the proxies procured through use of the allegedly defective notice and that a
majority of the stockholders would not have ratified the stock
option if they had knowledge of the omissions in the notice. Such
allegations of causality are surely
express and potentially provable
243
sufficient to avoid dismissal.
The court went on to suggest that even lesser allegations might sustain
a lOb-5 action: "This court will not, however, go so far as to say that
such allegations are necessary, nor that allegations of some lesser or mmimal causal nexus would not be sufficient." 2 "

In Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, Inc.,245 the Seventh
Circuit rejected the contention that the Barnett causation test for a 14(a)
suit should be applied in a lob-5 action. The court held that Barnett
was decided mainly on 14(a) grounds and was concerned with "but
for" causation. Citing SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,' 46 Judge Cummings stated:
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
stated:

Id.
Id.
266 F Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Id. at 530-31.
Id. at 530.
Id. In Smith v. Muchison, 310 F Supp. 1079, 1084 (SD.N.Y. 1970), the court

In order to state a claim under.Rule 10b-5, however, it must appear not
only that a purchase or sale took place, but that there was a loss and that the
loss flowed directly from the purchase or sale.
See also Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 300 F. Supp.
1083 (SD.N.Y. 1969); Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Hoover v.
Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (SD.N.Y. 1965).
245. 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969).
246. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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"The gravamen of the complaint was the misrepresentation, not
the merger." Thus, unlike Section 14 cases, we are not concerned
primarily with whether the merger or sale of assets could have
been affected absent the deceptive statements, but rather with
injury to shareholders or to the corporations which results from the
use of deceptive devices proscribed by Rule 10b-5. To apply the
Barnett rationale to the present claim under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 would be to sanction all manner of fraud and overreaching in the fortuitous circumstance that a controlling share247
holder exists.
The Swanson court was apparently loath to apply any strict construction upon the causation requirement in a 10 (b) complaint, but no discussion as to what degree of causal nexus will suffice was offered.
The Second Circuit confronted the causation issue in a short form

merger situation in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Company, 4 s and held
that "[w] hat must be shown is that there was deception which misled
stockholders and that this was in fact the cause of plaintiff's claimed
injury" 149
A later Second Circuit decision, Globus v. Law Research Service,
, reinforced the Vine holding and firmly committed the circuit
Inc.,250
to a proximate cause test. The appellate opinion quoted with approval
Judge Mansfield's trial court instructions to the jury[T] he plaintiff is required to prove by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that he or she suffered damages as a proximate result of

the alleged misleading statements and purchase of stock in reliance
on them. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the misleading statement or omission played a substantial part in bringing
about or causing the damage suffered by him or her and that the
or a reasonably foreseeable result
damage was either a direct result
251
of the misleading statement.

The court went on to say that "[t]he instructions were sufficient to
bring home the basic concept that causation must be proved else defendants could be liable to the whole world." 252
247
248.
249.
250.

415 F.2d at 1331.
374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
Id. at 634-35.
418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).

251. Id. at 1291.
252. See also Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. '1967)-,

1972]

SEC RULE

10b-5

The Globus case seemed to leave no doubt that the Second Circuit
considered proximate cause to be the proper standard in a lob-5 case,
but proximate cause took a giant step backwards in two recent district
court cases. In Chasns v. Smith, Barney and Company,25 3 the court did

not require that the loss be proximately caused by defendant's 10b-5
violation, but rather that defendant be shown to have engaged in activity in violation of the Rule, that plaintiff be shown to have relied
upon such violation, and that loss be shown ultimately to result there254

from.

Since the Chasns court either attached no importance to reliance in
nondisclosure cases, or presumed it from materiality, the case seems
to stand for a test of tort causation in fact where the nondisclosure
results in a loss to the plaintiff. Certainly it is apparent that notung
resembling proximate cause is any longer necessary in private 10b-5
actions. The Second Circuit impliedly approved of this new causation
test by not discussing causation at all in affrming the trial court's decision.255 Thus, the circuit seems to have abandoned its proximate cause
standard enunciated in Vine and Globus and has shifted toward causanon in fact, while at the same time substantially discarding any fore2
seeability requirement.

50

The Chasns decision received considerable support in a California
district court case, Robinson v. Guppies Container Company 257 Stating
that Cbasns has cleared away a great deal of the confusion surrounding
the treatment of "causal nexus" in lOb-5 cases, the court declared, "
it
is clear that the 'causation' required is simply that the action on defendant's part, which is alleged to have violated Rule 10b-5, must have
been relied upon by plaintiff when he entered the transaction." 2 s To
squelch any doubt as to the test of causation it was using, the court held
"that the 'causation in fact' required in Rule lob-5 cases has been sufficiently alleged in this action to allow the complaint to withstand a
Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1967); Barnett v. Anaconda
Co., 238 F Supp. 766, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 6 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 3880-81.
253. 305 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
254. 305 F Supp. at 495-96.
255. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cit. 1970).
256. Defendant's argument that it should not be held liable because it had relied on
customary industry practice was rejected by the Chasms court, suggesting that any
test of foreseeability was also rejected.
257. 316 F Supp. 1362 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
258. ld. at 1366.
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motion to dismiss." 259 In reaching this test, the court first examined
the concept of "causal nexus" in lob-5 cases in which causation was
crucial,2 60 and concluded that the precedent in this area was very
unclear.
In contrast to the shifting of position which has characterized the
courts' stance on causation in damage actions under 10b-5, courts are
more uniformly aligned on the issue in claims for injunctive relief. The
Second Circuit faced such a case in Mutual Shares Corporationv. Genesco Co.261 wherein plaintiffs alleged the defendant insiders mampulated
the market price of a corporation's stock by keeping dividends paid on
the stock to a minmum in order to acquire the stock from minority
shareholders at depressed prices. These allegations were held to be
sufficient to state a lob-5 claim since injunctive relief rather than monetary damages was sought. The court noted that while the above allegations would not support a claim for damages because of the lack of
causal connection, claims for injunctive relief avoid the strict causal
relationship which must be shown in private damage actions. 26
The watered-down approach to causation expressed in Genesco was
explicitly followed by the Sixth Circuit in Britt v. Cyril Bath Company,26" another case involving a claim for injunctive relief:
We choose to follow the relaxed causation-reliance approach of
the Second Circuit, particularly in this case involving a claim for
injunctive relief against an alleged violation consisting primarily
of nondisclosure of facts matenal to the pnce of the company's
2 64

stock.

Taken together, Genesco and Britt point out a trend toward extendIng a rather relaxed causation requirement to a plaintiff seeking injunctive or prophylactic relief, a trend which could influence a plaintiff to
abandon his claim for damages if it appears he may have trouble provIng a causal connection between defendant's actions and his loss.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1365, discussing List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert.
dented, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F Supp. 702 (D.N.J. 1968); Barnett v. Anaconda
Co., 238 F Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also the cases listed in 6 L. Loss, supra note 3,
at 3887
261. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
262. Id. at 547
263. 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969).
264. Id. at 436.
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Conclusion
It appears that causation, long one of the most nebulous elements
involved in 10b-S litigation, has entered a period of relative stability
In damage actions, Chasms and Robinson indicate that the tort concept
of proximate cause has been discarded in favor of a less rigid reqirement of causation in fact. In actions for injunctive relief, Genesco and
Britt suggest that the requirement of allegations of causation may have
been so relaxed as to be almost completely discarded, or at least substantially diminished. Certainly such relative unanimity behind such an
important element of a 10b-5 action cannot help but strengthen the
Rule's status as an all-inclusive anti-fraud statute.
JURISDICTIONAL MEANS-VENUE-SERVICE

OF PRocEss

JurisdictionalMeans
In order to establish a valid claim under Rule lob-5, one of the three

2 -6 5
jurisdictional means requirements must be satisfied. Both section 10 (b)
and Rule Iob-5 26 6 provide:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails, or any facility of any national secuttles exchange
[to carry out the proscribed conduct of Rule lob-5. 267
The majority of courts hold that the misleading statement need not
be transmitted through the jurisdictional means?. s It is necessary to
show only that the transaction involved the use "of" interstate com9
merce means, the mails, or the facilities of a national stock exchange.2
265. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).
266. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1971).

267. Id.
268. Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965) (mails used to introduce plaintiff and defendant); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (defendant's transportation of stock certificate on commercial aircraft after sale); Errion v. Connell, 236

F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) (interstate teletype involving sale of securities and land); Fratt
v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) (use of mails to instruct defendant's bank

concerning delivery of stock); Contra, Kemper v. Lohnes, 173 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1949).
269. The majority of courts have reached the same result concerning section 12(2)
of the 1933 Act which contains basically the same jurisdictional language as lob-s.
Section 5 as incorporated into section 12(1), however, prohibits certain conduct "in"
interstate commerce. United States v. Robertson, 181 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The

use of "in" is construed to indicate Congressional intent that the misleading statement
le transmitted through an avenue of interstate commerce.
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In Myzel v. Fields,170 the Eighth Circuit probably reached the most
liberal extention of federal jurisdiction, finding an intrastate telephone
call sufficient because the same lines were used in other situations to
carry interstate messages.
Venue-Service of Process
Venue and service of process for all claims under the 1934 Act are
regulated by section 27271 which provides:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this
[Act] or rules and regulations thereunder, or enjoin any violation
may be brought in any such district, or in the district where
the defendant is found, or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and
process in such cases may be served in any other district of which
the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be
2 72
found.
Suit may therefore be brought in any jurisdiction where the violation
takes place, where the defendant may be found, where the defendant
transacts business, or where the defendant resides. Bromberg notes that
the courts have generally construed venue requirements liberally in
determining whether an act within the forum district constituted the

violation.

73

Service of process establishing personal jurisdiction is permitted
274
wherever the defendant resides or wherever he can be found.
PRIVITY

One of the first cases to address the question of privity as an element
in a IOb-5 cause of action was Joseph v. FarnsworthRadio & Television
Corp.175 Therein, it was alleged by the plaintiff purchasers of stock, who
were also sung derivatively, that the directors and officers of the defendant corporation had intentionally issued false and misleading financial statements simultaneously with their own sales of the corporation's
shares. As a result of the misrepresentations, defendants were able to
270. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967).
271. 15 U.S.C. § 7899 (1970),

272. Id.
273.
274,

A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 11.4.
Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th-Cir. 1965)

275. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio, &.Teevision Corp., 198 FId 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
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sell their stock at an inflated price. Thus, plaintiffs suffered loss by
purchasing the stock based on inaccurate information and later sold at
a lower price due to a market decline. The lower court 76 dismissed
the derivative suit and, in dealing with the plaintiff's claims as mdividuals, concluded:
A semblance of privity between the vendor and purchaser of the
security in connection with which the improper act, practice, or
course of business was involved seems to be requisite and it is
277
entirely lacking here.

This decision was affirmed, 278 but Judge Frank, in a strong dissent, 279
pointed out that since the purpose of the Act was to curtail fraud in
security transactions, it would seem illogical to require privity since
even at common law privity of contract was not necessary in an action
for fraud. Although Joseph has been followed, 2 0 its validity as precedent has been completely eroded in later decisions. 281 Foremost among
these is Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Ic. 28 2 with facts similar to those
in Joseph. Judge Lord reasoned that since the private right of action
under the securities laws derives from common law tort concepts which
impose liability for violating a statute designed to prevent certain types
of injury, it would seem that the requirement of privity would be an
"unwarranted constriction" on the broadness envisioned by the federal securities laws. 2s Similarly, the Second Circuit has discredited the

Joseph case. 8 4 In Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.285

the court in discussing two other decisions, 5- 6 concluded that "for a claim
under Rule Iob-5 the purchase or sale need not be between plaintiff and
276. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D..Y. 195i).

277. Id. at 706.
278. 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cit. 1952).
279. Id. at 884.
280. See, e.g., Donovan, Inc. v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
281. See Gann v. Berzomatic Corp., 262 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
282. 229 F Supp. 33 (ED. Pa. 1964).
283. Id. at 37
284. Other cases simply ignored Joseph. See Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne,
307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F Supp. 239, 243-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
285. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969).

286. Here the court was discussing Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co, 374 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 US. 970 (1967) and A.T. Brod and Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d
393 (2d Cir. 1967).
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defendant, [and] that there need not be privity between plaintiff and defendant." 287 Thus, the question of privity as an element in a lob-5 acton is moot.
DEFENDANT'S STATUS AS A PURCHASER OR SELLER

In addition to the privity issue the question remains, must the defendant be a purchaser or seller of securities in order for the plaintzff
to recover damages in a 10b-5 action? In situations where the plaintiff
alleges reliance on the defendant's false or misleading statements, the
Miller court has held sufficient plaintiff's claims that defendant's fraud
was related to plaintiff's purchase or saleSS-indicatng that a purchase
or sale by the defendant is not necessary Other courts have reached
opposite results. 28 9 However, recent decisions seem unconcerned with
defendant's status as a purchaser or seller. In fact it seems well settled
that any dissimenator of false information can be held liable-as in the
Texas Gulf Sulphur case. 90 The principal inquiry since the Second
Circuit decided Texas Gulf

91

has shifted from an examnation of the

defendant as a purchaser or seller to the question of whether plaintiff
must be a purchaser or seller to maintain a 1ob-5 action. The view of
determining plaintiff's status as a purchaser or seller has come to be
known as the Birnbaum doctrine in dubious honor of the 1952 decision
of the Second Circuit imposing this seemingly arbitrary burden on

292
would-be plaintiffs.

PLAINTIFF'S STATUS AS A PURCHASER OR SELLER

In affirming a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit rendered one of the landmark decisions in the field of federal
287. 417 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir. 1969). See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1767-71.
288. 229 F Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
92,116 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Howard
289. Mooney v. Vitolo, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
v. Levine, 262 F Supp. 643 (SD.N.Y. 1965).

290. Carroll v. First National Bank of Lincolnwood, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969). The
court states that the "in connection with" language of the statute is sufficient even
though the bank "may have neither bought nor sold for its own account." 413 F.2d 353,
357

See also Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903

(1969) where the court held there was no requirement that defendants trade in
securities.
291. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1968).
292. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp, 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. demed,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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securities regulation-Birnbaumv. Newport Steel Corporation.29a After
acknowledging that Rule lob-5 "may have been somewhat loosely
drawn,"

2

4

the court concluded:

(1) that Section 10(b) was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the purchase or sale of securities,
(2) that it extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or
seller, and
(3) that it was not intended to provide a remedy for fraudulent nusmanagement of corporate affairs.
Thus, under the initial Birnbaum construction of 10b-5, the courts
examined the character of the alleged fraud, determined whether it was
of the type usually associated with the purchase or sale of securities
rather than with fraudulent corporate mismanagement, and then allowed
a plaintiff to proceed only after a showing that he was a purchaser or
seller of a security
In 1960, Birnbaum's first holding received a serious blow from the
Fifth Circuit in Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp.95 Therein
the court granted recovery to an issuer of stock whose shares were
fraudulently acquired in a rather unique transaction-the corporation
netted no consideration whatsoever for its shares. More recently, as a
6 which was followed by the Supreme
result of A. T Brod v. Perlow,"1
T
Court in Superintendent of Insurancev. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., "
it has now become apparent that the "usually associated with" limitation
of Birnbaum has finally been put to rest. A portion of the Brod opinion
is indicative of this fact:
We believe that 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent
schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
293. Id.
294. Id. at 463. Judge Augustus N. Hand remarked "[w]hile the Rule may have been
somewhat loosely drawn its meamng and scope are not difficult to ascertain when
reference is had to the scheme of SEC Regulation and the purpose underlying the
adoption of X-10B-5." Judge Hand continued that the only purpose of the Rule was
to make the "prohibitions of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applicable to purchasers as
well as sellers." Id.
295. 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
296. 375 F.2d 393 (2dCir. 1967).
297. 92 S.Ct. 165 (1971).
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whether the artifices employed involved a garden type variety of
fraud, or present a unique form of deception. [The use of] novel
98
or atypical methods should not provide immunity
Nevertheless, the other Birnbaum holdings, that Iob-5 cannot remedy
corporate mismanagement and that the plaintiff must be a purchaser
or seller of a security, continue in varying degrees to restrict the availability of federal relief. 2 99
However, before embarking on a discussion of the continued vitality
of the two remaimng prongs of Birnbaum, it is helpful to review the
defimtions of "purchase" and "sale" and also the distinction which has
developed between the elements necessary to support claims for equitable, as opposed to legal, relief.
Vhat Constitutes a "Purchase" or "Sale"?
The proscribed activities under Rule lob-5 are actionable only when
they are perpetrated "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security" 300 Perhaps to avoid the harshness of the Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement, the courts have expressed almost no hesitation 3° 1 in construing the defimtional provisions of the 1934 Act in a
broad fashion.
Section 3 (a) (13) provides that "[t] he terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each
include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." [Emphasis supplied] 30 2 Similarly, section 3 (a) (14) states that "[t] he terms
'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose
of." [Emphasis supplied] 30 3 It was observed by Judge Schnackenberg,
in Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.,30 4 that the breadth of these defimtional
sections clearly indicates a Congressional intent that their scope be much
298. 375 F.2d at 397

299. See generally Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law"- An Assessment, 78

HARV.

L. REv. 1147 (1965); Lowenfels, Rule lOb-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Action,
18 VAND. L. REv. 893 (1965); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of
Corporations by Implication Through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw U.L. REv. 185 (1964);

Susman, Use of Rule lOb-5 as a Remedy for Minority Shareholders of Close Corporations, 22 Bus. LAw 1193 (1967).
300. See note 22 supra.

301. For cases which have hesitated, see, e.g., Cohen v Colvin, 266 F Supp. 677
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
302. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(13) (1970).
303. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(14) (1970).
304. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).

1972]

SEC RULE

lOb-5

larger than the traditional common law connotation of a purchase or
5
80

sale.

In M. L. Lee & Co. v. American Cardboardand Packaging Corp.,306
the court was confronted with a situation in which an issuer and an
underwriter made a binding contract for the purchase of the corporanon's shares for resale to the public. Because of a drop in the market,
the sale was never consummated. In denying a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, the court looked to section 3 in holding that the defrauded plaintiff had a viable lob-5 claim where the alleged fraud was
in connection with a contract to purchase or sell secunties, even though
the actual sale was never completed307
It was also observed in the Vine decision that the word "includes"
in each section is a key indication that the definitions were not meant to
be exhaustive of all possible types of situations which Congress intended
to be covered.308 Other language similarly emphasizes the breadth of
thus section.309 In Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp. 1 the
court held that the "otherwise dispose[d] of" language in section 3(a)
(14) was broad enough to encompass the issuance of securities.311
On the other hand, the mechanical approach to the scope of 10(b)
has been criticized. In SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,'12 the Court
305. Id. at 266.
306. 36 F.RD. 27 (ED. Pa. 1964).
307. See also Allico Nat. Corp. v. Amalgam. Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of
North America, 397 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1968) (fraudulent breach of contract to sell
securities held actionable under iob-5).
308. In Vine v. Beneficial Finance Company, Inc., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), the
court stressed that Congress selected the verb "includes" rather than the verb "means"
for these critical defimtions. It went on to remark that "the phrases 'or otherwise
acquire' and 'or otherwise dispose of' are hardly lirmuting." Id. at 634.
309. The original Senate bill (S.2693) took an even more expansive approach to the
purchase-sale definitions. In part, it provided:
11. The terms "buy" and "purchase" each include any contract to buy,
purchase, or otherwise acquire, contract of purchase, attempt or offer to
acquire or solicitation of an offer to sell a security or any interest in a
security
12. The terms "sale" and "sell" each include any contract of sale or
disposition of, contract to sell or dispose of, attempt or offer to dispose of,
or solicitation of an offer to buy a security or any interest therein.
78 Cong. Rec. 2264 (1934). At some later point in its travels, the "attempt or offer"
language was apparently deleted by Congress.
310. Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
demed, 365 U.S. 814 (1960).

311. Id. at 202.
312. 393 U.S. 453 (1968).
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indicated that the definitional sections were basically "unhelpful." Jusnce Marshall felt that the policy question-whether or not the alleged
conduct was of a type meant to be prohibited-should be the main
inquiry31 ' Further, sections 3(a) (13) and 3(a) (14) themselves are
qualified by the prefatory phrase "unless the context otherwise requires."
This dictates that the definitions not be applied in a rigid or restrictive
manner and further emphasizes the need for inquiry into the purposes
of section 10.314
Equipped with these broad definitional tools, the Birnbaum requirement of a purchase or sale would not appear to limit severely standing
to sue under lob-5. However, by deciding that an injured party must
himself be a purchaser or seller, the Birnbaum court would close the
door to many prospective plaintiffs.
The inroads made available by the definitional arguments do mitigate
the harshness of the purchaser-seller rule. But they are not solely responsible for the expansive trend in the 10b-5 area. Another equally
important factor has been the more lenient attitudes of the federal courts
in cases where the plaintff seeks equitable relief under lob-5
Equitable Relief
Although the plaintiffs in the Birnbaum case were seeking damages,
the purchaser-seller requirement was not initially confined to damage
actions but was also extended to claims for equitable relief.315 Beginning with SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,3 which was
decided by the Supreme Court, a number of courts have held that in
equity all of the elements required in a suit for monetary damages need
not be proved or alleged by the plaintiffs. In Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco 17 this logic was directly applied to 10(b) Mutual Shares involved the defendant's acquisition of a controlling interest in S.H. Kress
& Co.-half via market purchases and the balance through public tender
offers. It was during the tender offer period that the plaintiffs purchased
their shares. The claim for damages and injunctive relief was divided
into two periods: First, during the time before plaintiffs purchased, it
was alleged that defendants fraudulently failed to disclose an under313. Id. at 466-67
314. Id. at 467
315. See Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967); Studebaker
Corp. v. Allied Products Corp., 256 F Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
316. 375 US. 180 (1963).
317. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
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valuation of Kress's real estate holdings and concealed an intent to manage Kress solely for their own benefit. Second, dealing with the time
interval after the plaintiffs became Kress shareholders, it was alleged that
defendants had operated Kress solely for the defendants' benefit and had
manipulated the market price of the Kress stock (by lowering dividends) so as to acquire additional shares at depressed prices.
After a summary dismissal of the plaintiff's damage claims, the court
addressed itself to the requests for equitable relief. In brushing aside
defendants' argument that plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers,
the court commented: "[W]e do not regard the fact that plaintiffs
have not sold their stock as controlling on the claim for injunctive
relief." 818
This declination to require a purchase or sale in claims for equitable
relief has been justified on several grounds:
(1) upon a showing of a continuing mampulative scheme, injunctive
relief is justified, 19
(2) injunctive actions avoid proof of loss problems, and thus a purchase or sale is unnecessary as monetary damages need not be
established, 20
(3) private injunctive actions constitute a necessary supplement to
SEC regulation, 21
(4) the prophylactic nature of the securities laws justifies prevention
of inchoate violations.22
Several courts have taken a more expansive view of this so-called
1"equitable relief exception" to the purchaser-seller requirement. The
Third Circuit in Kahan v. Rosenstzel 2 indirectly faced this question
318. Id. at 546. See also Symington-Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 383
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967), where the court decided an injunction case on the merits
that plaintiffs [had]
after glossing over the Birnbaum rule by "assun[ing] arguendo
standing." 383 F.2d at 842.
319. 384 F.2d at 546.
320. Id. at 547 See also Britt v. Cyril Bath Company, 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969)
321. See Ruclde v. Roto America Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Ci. 1964); Moore v.
Greatameica Corp., 274 F Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
322. In Kahan v. Rosensuel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970), the court stated:
A suit which seeks to enjoin deceptive practices which if continued 'would
lead to completed purchases and sales that give rise to a cause of action
under a 10(b) is not inconsistent with [the] policy [of the act] and will in
fact promote free and open public securities markets. [Emphasis supplied].
323. 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970).
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an action brought for attorney fees by a representative shareholder
who had neither purchased nor sold. The interesting point in this case
is that although the shareholder suit failed to make a specific request
for equitable relief, the complaint did ask for such "further relief as
may be just." 324 Seizing upon this phrase as sufficiently invoking the
court's equitable powers, Judge Adams held that any form of relief may
properly be granted including an injunction where a cause of action
for injunctive relief is in fact inherent in the complaint. 325 Although
other courts have followed a similar line of reasoning to deny a defendant's motion to dismiss, 326 it has been pointed out that such an approach necessarily breeds confusion due to the "inappropriateness of
loolung to the ultimate power of the court to provide relief in the case
before it, and equating that power with the ability of the plaintiff to
invoke it in the first instance." 327
The aforementioned cases have dealt with the question of prospective relief, but the natural extension of their logic also raises the issue
of the availability of retrospective relief. When this problem arose in
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 328 it received little attention.
Upon remand to the trial court, the opimon concluded "[W]ithout
limitation [Crane's] remedies may include damages, if any, prospective
,,=
injunctive relief, as well as appropriate retrospective relief
Although no detailed explanation was given, Judge Smith apparently
Case Co v. Borak3 0 that "it is the duty of
relied on the statement in .I.
the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make
effective the congressional purpose" 331 of the Act. " '
Most recently in Tully v. Mott Supermarkets,33 the Third Circuit
squarely addressed itself to the question of the availability of equitable
relief under 10b-5 Plaintiffs therein, formerly controlling shareholders
324. Id. at 173-74.

325. Id.
326. See, e.g., F.S.L.I.C. v. Fielding, CCH FED.

SEC.

L.

REP.

92,680 (D. Nev. 1969)

327. Kellog, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue
Under Rule lOb-5 Involved, 20 BuFF. L. REv. 93, 105 (1970).
328. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969)

329. Id.at 803.
330. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).

331. Id.at 433.
332. In Berne St. Enterprises, Inc. v. American Export Isbrandtsen Co., CCH FED.
92,711 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court interpreted Mutual Shares as authority
SEc. L. RE,.
for granting only prospective relief and not available where the fraudulent exchange is
fully consummated.
333. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 193,377 (D.N.J. 1972).
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who had neither purchased nor sold their stock, complained of the
fraudulent issuance of voting shares by their corporation which effected
a shifting in the locus of the corporate control. The complaint prayed
for the validation of the issuance of shares and also for a new election
of directors to purge the taint already visible as a result of the fraud.
When the defendant contended that the plaintiffs had no standing
under Birnbaun's purchaser-seller rule, the court stated that (1) no
such limitation on the plaintiffs is found in the language of the statute,
(2) nothing in the Rule supports such an argument, and (3) that to
imply such a requirement "ignores the recent edict by the Supreme
Court mandating a flexible as opposed to a technical or restrictive construction of the Rule." 34 Furthermore, Judge Whipple viewed the
defendant's position as "directly opposed to the present trend in the
law" 3' The opinion then concluded:
Accordingly this court holds that the nature of the injunctive
relief sought in the absence or presence of a buyer or seller is not
determinative of federal jurisdiction under Rule lOb-5 Instead,
federal jurisdiction hinges on the existence of a causal relationship
between fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities and plaintiff's loss. [Emphasis supplied]. 3

Allegations of Corporate Mismanagement
After a review of the Birnbaum opinion, it becomes apparent that
the court was concerned that the antifraud provisions of section 10 (b)
and Rule lob-5 should not be construed to provide a federal means for
the wholesale enforcement of corporate management's fiduciary duties.
37
The fact that these claims might well be cognizable in state courts
and the concomitant irritation stemming from the already overloaded
federal dockets clearly could have colored Judge Augustus Hand's atti334. Id. 91,932.
335. Id.
336. Id. 91,933.
337. Recently as armicus in the Bankers Life case, the SEC expressed to the Supreme
that the availCourt its concern arising from "the court of appeals' apparent view
ability of a remedy under state law for the alleged fraud is relevant in determining the
applicability of the federal securities laws" The brief continued "[iit would be a most
unsatisfactory basis for determining the coverage of the federal securities laws, to
have to decide, on a case-to-case basis, whether state law would provide an adequate
remedy for the particular fraud involved." Brief for the SEC as amicus curiae at 10-11,
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 92 S.Ct. 165 (1971).
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tude regarding the propriety of creating (or acknowledging) a federal
remedy in this area. However, the attitudes of the federal bench notwithstanding, prospective plaintiffs have much to gain by pursuing
their claims under the federal securities laws. When an action is based
upon the violation of the 1934 Act, the venue,3 choice of forum,""
nationwide service of process provislons,340 and the resulting escape
from the state security for costs statutes in derivative suits34' all combine to tantalize litigants to seek federal rather than state redress of thewr
grievances. In light of these and other significant federal statutory
advantages, 3 2 it is obvious why the scope of section 10(b) and Rule
lob-5 have been subjected to continual testing in private actions. Traditionally, as a result of Birnbaum, the strategic use of 10b-5 in damage
suits to remedy corporate nusmanagement has been decided on the basis
of one central inquiry-were the plaintiffs (or their corporations in a
derivative suit) 3- s injured as purchasers or sellers of securities.
1. Sale of Control Shares-Focuson the Plaintiff
Management abuses take on various forms in the adrmmstration of
corporate affairs by persons who act in fiduciary capacities. One vexIng and continuing problem has been the deterrmnation of whether a
remedy under 10b-5 is available where directors have breached a fiduciary duty by means of, or in connection with, their own purchase or
3
sale of a security

44

In the Birnbaum case, the plaintiff stockholders of Newport Steel
sued the corporation's directors based upon a violation of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 The plaintiffs complained that the directors rejected
338. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
339. See Zorn v. Anderson, 263 F Supp. 745, 747-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
340. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
341. See McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. demed,
368 U.S. 939 (1961); Weitzen v. Kearns, 262 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd sub
nom. Epstein v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 388 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968).
342. For a discussion of class actions under Rule 10b-5 and an analysis of the implicatons of the rapid substantive expansion in this area see Note, The Impact of Class
Actions on Rule lOb-, 38 U. Cm-.L. Rxv. 337 (1971).
343. In a derivative suit under 10b-5, the corporation is the real party plaintiff; thus
is not whether a purchase or sale was made by an individual
"the question presented
whether there was a purchase or sale by the corporation
shareholder, but [rather]
itself." Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1967). See also Howard
v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
344. See generally Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum To Schoenbaum: The Exchange
Act And Self Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F 332 (1970).
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a merger offer favorable to all the corporation's shareholders, misrepresented the status of the rejected merger, and then sold their controlling
shares at a premium to a third party 34' In dismissing the action, the
Birnbaum court held that a corporation or its shareholders cannot utilize Rule 10b-5 unless, as a prospective plaintiff, one or the other has
purchased or sold a security 346 Thus, the transactional status of the
plaintiff in relation to the fraudulent act was firmly established as the
exclusive means by which to weed out those breaches of fiduciary duty
3 47
cognizable under the Rule from the remainder that were not.
At least in the sale of control cases, this focus upon the actions of
the plaintiff has generally remained unchanged. 34 8 In Christophzdes v.
Parco,34 9 the Second Circuit indicated that Birnbaum's purchaser-seller
requirement was still the rule. And in the recent Fifth Circuit case of
Erlingv. Powell,350 another federal forum confirmed the vitality of the
purchaser-seller aspect of Birnbaurn. In the words of the Erling court:
parnor the corporation
[N]either Erling individually
ticipated in the capacity of "purchaser" or "seller" in the allegedly
stock.351
fraudulent sales of
In essence, Erling's claims rest upon an alleged breach of fiduciary
not [upon]
duty owing the corporation and other shareholders
deception practiced in the actual buying or selling of secunties.3
On the other hand, where a shareholder can demonstrate that he has
sold, a claim may be asserted under lob-5 even though the sale was not
to the defendant. In Ferraioliv. Cantor,3 Birnbaum was distinguished
where minority shareholders disposed of their stock while unaware that
a premium purchase offer had been made to the corporation's directors.
345. 98 F Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
346. 193 F.2d at 464.
347. One case decided four years prior to Birnbaum apparently took a more expansive approach to 10b-5. However, it was decided without opinion. See McManus v.
Jessup & Moore Paper Co., Civ. No. 8015 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
348. See generally Cashm v. Mencher, 255 F. Supp. 545, 548 (SD.N.Y. 1965); Beury
v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. W Va. 1954).
349. 289 F Supp. 403 (1968).
350. 429 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970).
351. Id. at 799.
352. Id. at 800.
353. 281 F Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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The existence of such an offer was held to be material informatlon- 54 knowledge of which the directors extended to only a select group of
shareholders.3 55 The gist of the plaintiffs' complaint was that they would
not have sold to the third parties at the lower price had they known of
the outstanding premium offer.
However, even this material information theory, which can be advanced only after the plaintiff has sold, has itself been qualified due to
the most recent appeal in Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.35 6 The Dasho
court, commenting upon the duty of disclosure, stated:
We do not believe Rule lOb-5 imposes an obligation on controlling shareholders to make prompt disclosure of every offer
they receive, and [we] find no evidence that an earlier disclosure
offer would have benefitted plaintiffs in any way 357
of the
Consequently, it is evident that even today the purchaser-seller rule
must be satisfied in a situation involving the sale of control stock. 5
Otherwise, as in Birnbaum, the plaintiffs must turn to state law, and
state courts (absent diversity of citizenship) for the adjudication of
359
their monetary claims.
2. Issuance of Securities
When director misconduct results in the issuance of corporate shares
whereby the corporation is defrauded, an instance is presented where a
breach of fiduciary duty arises in connection with a securities transaction.
In the Hooper 6 case, a derivative suit, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found little difficulty in holding the issuance of stock to
be a "sale" 361 despite the fact that the corporation was not acting as an
"investor." The court justified this application of the Rule to an entity
not technically an "investor" by pointing to the rulemaking power dele354.

Id.

at 358.

355. But see Haberman v. Murchison, 1972 CCH
1971)
356. 1972 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
357 Id. 91,841.

FED. SEC.

L. REP.

93,305 (S.D.N.Y.

93,342 (7th Cir. 1972)

358. See generally Herpich v Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Shell v.
Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970)

359. In Pearlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), the Birnbaum defendants
were subsequently held liable to the minority shareholders under state law
360. 282 F.2d

361. Id. at 203.

195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961)
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gated to the SEC under the "public interest" clause of section 10(b) .362
Thus, 1ob-5 was construed to protect a corporation not only -as an
"investor" but also as an "issuer."
Hooper was not a "fiduciary duty" type case because the perpetrators
of the fraud were outsiders. Nonetheless, in Petit v. American Stock
Exchange,363 the court did follow the Hooper rule, that the corporate
issuer has a cause of action under lob-5 stemming from the breach of
a fiduciary duty in connection with the issuance of stock. However,
Petit's facts are somewhat different from Hooper in that a public distribution of the issuer's stock was indispensable to the successful completion of the fraud. The Petit case is most significant because the
court adopted the position that merely because the fraud was perpetrated
by insiders, there was no reason why lob-5 should not applyIt is of course true that irrespective of the broad language of
Rule 10(b)5, the courts have been disinclined to allow "innumerable facets of internal corporate affairs" to be included within
federal question junsdiction on the basis of a purchase or sale of
securities that is only incidental to a major mismanagement issue.
On the other hand, that the fraud was perpetrated by insiders
does not render Section 10(b) inapplicable,if the transaction represents an abuse of the secunrties trading process, and should be
properly subject to SEC regulations for an adequate remedy
64
[Emphasis supplied] .A
Petit adhered to the second Birnbaum rule, found a seller, and disregarding the third rule allowed a 10b-5 recovery Generally, the
courts dealing with "issuance of stock" cases have also found the corporation to be a seller by following Hooper and Petitt 65 Ruckle v.
Roto Am. Corp.6 6 is typical of this trend. In an action to enjoin the
issuance of treasury shares, the court had little trouble with Birnbaum's
sale requirement, and acknowledged:
362. The court argued that the SEC was authorized to promulgate rules and regulations not onlv "for the protection of investors" but also had power to be exercised
"in the public interest." Id. at 202.
363. 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
364. Id. at 25.
365. See, e.g, Papas v. Moss, 257 F Supp. 345 (D. NJ. 1966), reV'd on other grounds,
393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Kane v. Central American Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F
Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del.
1962).
366. 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
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[A]s a matter of authority and principle, the issuance by a corporation of its own shares is a "sale" to which the ant-fraud
policy expressed in the secunties acts extends.3 67
The court went on to emphasize:
[I]t cannot be that the federal regulatory scheme is promoted
but not a
by allowing a private person to sue [under lOb-5]
308
private corporation.
Thus, with respect to the issuance cases, courts have observed that
they are treading in the realm of fiduciary relationships. But as a practical matter,36 it hardly appears that this has dampened their adventuresome approach in determimng whether the issuance of stock constitutes
a "sale." 370
3 Fraud Related to Mergers
When a plaintiff alleges fraudulent director activities incident to a
merger (or a proposed merger) and seeks damages under 10b-5, the
purchaser-seller constraints of Brnbaum, though somewhat softened,
are still present. Under the theory of Dasho v. Susquehanna 71 a merger
that involves the exchange of stock is a "sale" by the corporate entity
Hence, a 10b-5 action can be maintained, either by the corporation or
by its shareholders in a derivative capacity
However, individual shareholders suing in their own stead are still
plagued by Birnbaum since a plaintiff must demonstrate that he person367. Id. at 27.
368. Id. at 28.
369. The Bankers Life decision (discussed infra) has already evidenced its influence
upon those seelang to put a restrictive interpretation upon 10b-5. See Drachman v.
Harvey, 1972 CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 93,345 (2d Cir. 1972).
370. Even though plaintiff shareholders may locate a "sale" upon which they are
entitled to assert a claim under 10b-5, recovery is by no means automatic. In O'Neill
v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), the court required an affirmative showing that
the corporation was deceived. Implicit in O'Neill is a holding that 10b-5 imposes no
duties beyond honest disclosure. 339 F.2d at 767 It should be noted, however, that
O'Neill was decided before the Second Circuit's expansive holdings in Vine and Brod.
See also Jannes v. Microwave Commumcations, 325 F Supp. 899 (N.D Ill. 1971);
Baehr v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1972 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,227 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
aff'd on otber grounds, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (1968)
371. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp, 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).
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ally was a buyer or seller. In Mader v. Armel,372 wherein a stockholder exchanged his shares as a result of a merger, the court found
a "sale."

373

In Vine v. Beneficial Finance Company,"" the plaintiff was a shareholder of Crown Finance, a corporation that was dissolved after the
completion of a short form merger which did not require his consent
to be effective. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant (Beneficial) had secured the requisite control of Crown by means of a fraudulent scheme
involving non-disclosure of its underlying intent to effect a merger.
Since Birnbaum required that plaintiffs be purchasers or sellers, the
court was faced with a problem-the plaintiff had not sold. In order
to grant recovery, the court judicially transformed Vine into a "forced
seller," 376 reasoning that completion of the merger forced plaintiff either
to surrender his shares to the corporation for cash, or to retain his certificates of ownership in a non-existent entity The court did focus on the
plaintiff, however, by more liberally construing the concept of a "seller"
under IOb-5,37 and recovery was perntted.Y
The Second Circuit was again called upon to deal with director mis378
conduct incident to merger-related activities, in Greenstein v. Paul
There the plaintiff, who held a minority interest in Sagamore Corporation, complained of a conspiracy by the defendant directors and
the majority shareholder of Sagamore. The defendants' alleged scheme
was to depress the market price of Sagamore stock, to acquire the
minority shares at a lower price by means of a "freeze out," and then
372. 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968).
373. The SEC originally took the position that an exchange of stock as a result of a
merger did not constitute a "sale." Since 1951, however, their arguments have been
to the contarry Mader v. Arnel, 402 F.2d 158, 160 (6th Cir. 1968).
374. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. demed, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
375. 374 F.2d at 635. In another Second Circuit case, A.T. Brod v. Perlow, 375
F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), the court was again forced to search for a purchase or sale by
the plaintiff in an action for damages under lob-S. Allegedly the defendant had directed
the plaintiff broker to purchase certain shares of stock intending to honor hUs obligation
to pay only in the event that the market advanced. When the value of the stocks fell,
the defendant failed to pay, and the broker was forced to cover at the settlement date.
Subsequently the broker sold these shares at a loss. Although the alleged fraud was
incident to the defendant's aborted purchase, the court felt that it extended itself and
also attached to the plaintiff's sale.
376. 374 F.2d at 636.
377. See also Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F Supp. 369 (D.
Del. 1965) (focus on the plaintiff's purchase of stock rather than her status as a forced
seller after a short form merger was used to support a 10b-5 clain).
378. 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1967).

WILLIAM AND

MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13 860

to merge Sagamore into another corporation. The plaintiff refused to
sell despite the manipulations, and the merger was called off. In dismissing the plaintff's individual action for damages, the court continued
to follow Birnbaum by demanding that the plaintiff himself be a seller,
or at least be a "forced seller" "Had this merger been carried out the
Vine case would be in point. But it was not." 379
Then came Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. 0 where a
frustrated tender offeror sued to block a proposed merger. In June of
1967, Crane began to purchase- Air Brake shares and subsequently proposed a merger to Air Brake's board. Air Brake rejected Crane as a
suitor and made plans to merge with Standard. Crane then embarked
on a tender offer campaign (to purchase Air Brake stock) which was
defeated at the last minute when Standard engaged in wash transactions
in Air Brake stock which "painted the tape" and deterred Air Brake's
shareholders from tendering to Crane. The Air Brake-Standard merger
was completed and, under threat of an anti-trust divestiture suit, Crane
was forced to dispose of the shares.
The trial court dismissed the action.38 On appeal, the court not only
held Crane to be a seller, but most significantly the Second Circuit
finally aimed its inquiry at the act of the defendant in effecting a secunties transaction, rather than telescoping exclusively upon the plaintiff's
status as a purchaser or seller under Birnbaum. The court commented:
Standard's failure to disclose its manipulations [of Air stock]
operated as a fraud or deceit on Crane in connection with the purqmte
chase and sale of securities, creating a right to relief in Crane
3
apart from Crane's rights as a forced seller under 9(a) (2). 82
Of equal importance is Judge Smith's holding with respect to Crane's
right to relief because the court's language clearly did not preclude
a recovery of damages. s 3
In the interim between the arguments in Crane and the time that
decision was actually handed down, the Second Circuit passed upon
Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.3 4 This case dealt
379. 400 F2d at 581. See also Chris Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
1972 CCH FFao. SEC. L. REP. 93,301 (2d Cit. 1971).
380. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970)

381. 326 F Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
382. 419 F.2d at 795.
383. Id. at 803.
384. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
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with fraudulent misrepresentations emanating from the Syracuse management which caused the failure of a tender offer by Iroquois. Unlike
Crane, the shareholders were tricked by written communications as
opposed to market transactions. Iroquois was dismissed s5 despite the
urgings of the SEC, as anucus, s6 that the purchaser-seller rule be discarded. Because the decisions were handed down so closely -together
within such a short period of time, and given the brief mentionl of
Iroquois in the Crane opinion, it is tenuous to rely upon Crane for the
proposition that a focus on the defendant is-now the rule. However
in an equitable action, Tully3 8 7 used Crane in just this manner. It appears that the plaintiff must still demonstrate his injury as a .purchaser
or seller.
4. Purchase and Sale of Corporate Assets
When the corporate asset disposed of is a security, or when the
corporation is by contract transferring its assets in exchange for a security, 8' fraudulent mismanagement incident to these transfers has been
held actionable under lob-5. As in the merger cases, the central queston is whether the individual or corporate plaintiff was a purchaser or
seller. Again the capacity in which the shareholder seeks relief is
significant.
385. Id. at 965.
386. SEC Brief as amicus curiae, Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.,
417 F.2d 963-(2d Cir. 1969).
387. 1972 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,377 (D.N.J. 1972).
388. Section 3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act provides:
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, certificate of interest or participation m any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateraltrust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for
a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security";
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or wararnt or right to subscribe to or purchase,
any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill
of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(12) (1970). Recently in Movielab Inc. v. Berkey Photo Inc., 1972 CCH
93,291 (2d Cir. 1971),. the Second Circit was again presented with
FED. SEc. L. REP.
a sale of assets transaction. In a per curiam opinion, the court held that the fraudulent
exchange of assets for a promissory note between two publicly held corporations constituted a fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of a security "
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Dasho v. Susquehanna,3 " discussed earlier, also concerned the Susquehanna Corporation's use of 10b-5 in another light. Its directors had
caused the corporation to dispose of 140,000 shares of Vanadium Corporation in return for Susquehanna stock and cash. The plaintiff
shareholders of Susquehanna brought a derivative suit alleging, inter
alia, that the corporation's Vanadium stock had been transferred for
less than its true value to placate a dissident group of shareholders. In
deciding whether such a misuse of the director's powers was a violation
of Iob-5, the court stated:
We are of the opinion that an acquisition or disposition of securites in exchange for other securities falls within the statutory
390
definitions [of a purchase or sale]
In Entel v. Allen,39' the existence of a derivative claim was also confirmed and the defense that the shareholders were not purchasers or
sellers was apparently rejected. In that case corporate control was allegedly misused to effect a sale of stock and notes at a price substantially less
than their market value. On rehearing, Judge Bonsal vacated a prior summary judgment with respect to the derivative suit and a shareholder class
action against the directors. Entel was admittedly decided after the
Second Circuit's holdings in Vine39 2 and Brod 93 had enlarged the scope
of a "sale" under 10b-5 But neither of these decisions purported to
eliminate the Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement. 4 And in Greenstein v. Paul,3 95 decided four months after Entel, Judge McLean realized
this fact, dismissing a class action by non-selling plaintiffs.3 96 Greenstein
389. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).

390. Id. at 266.
391. 270 F Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
392. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
393. 375 F.2d 393 (2d. Cir. 1967).
394. Both courts actually followed Birnbaum by finding the respective plaintiffs to
be purchasers or sellers. In Vine the court remarked: "the Commission advances the
alternative argument that plaintiff need not even be a selling stockholder to sue under
10b-5
In view of our disposition of the case [that Vine was a forced seller], it is
unnecessary to deal with this interesting contention." 374 F.2d 627, 636. And in Brod,
language is found that "[tihe Commission, in recent cases, has urged that [the Birnhawm
interpretation] of [iob-5] is too narrow
We need not consider that contention
since appellant is clearly a purchaser of a security" 375 F,2d 393, 397
395. 275 F Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
396. Id. at 606. See also SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F Supp. 3
(SD.N.Y. 1968), where the court granted injunctive relief in an action by the SEC
to secure injunctive relief against fraudulent director activities incident to the sale of
stock by a corporation held as an investment.
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was then affirmed on appeal 397 by a three-judge panel, one member of
which was Judge Smith who also sat on the Vine appeal. 398 Entel still
stands as a mystery with respect to the individual non-selling shareholders.
Another recent case, Drachman v. Harvey,3 9 indicates that while
the purchaser-seller rule has been relaxed, it has not been abandoned.
In Drachman, a scheme causing an issuer to redeem convertible debentures was held actionable in a lob-5 derivative suit only because 4the
00
redemption was deemed a purchase within the meaning of the Act.

The presence of definitional expansion was also evidenced in the
Seventh Circuit in the case of Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc.401 Therein,
a shareholder's derivative suit withstood a motion to dismiss where the
plaintiff alleged that his corporation was induced to transfer its assets
worth $1,870,000 in exchange for stock having a value of $440,000. The
defendant directors contended that lob-5 was not designed to encompass the "transfer of securities as a vehicle for the sale of a going business." 40 2 Without any significant discussion of the matter, the court
concluded that "the form of the transaction necessarily brought into
being a buyer and a seller of securities." The defendant's motion to
dismiss was demed.403
Due to the liberal approach of the courts in construing the definitional
sections, a significant intrusion into Birnbaur's third holding has developed. As the next section indicates, 10b-5 continues to march on
deeper into the realm of director misconduct-but the requirement of
a purchase or sale, by the plaintiff, remains.
397. 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1967).

398. See also Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.
1969).

399. 1972 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. t 93,345 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc)
400. But see GAF v. Millstem, 1972 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,300 (2d Cir. 1971);
Levine v. Selion, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971).
401. 1972 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,936 (N.D. 111. 1970).
402. Id. ti 90,471.
403. See also Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir.
1969), wherein the court declared:
It is no longer open to question that the exchange of shares in connection
with a
. sale of assets constitutes a "purchase or sale" within the
meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5.
415 F.2d at 1330. But see Cluodo v. General Waterworks Corp. 380 F.2d 860 (loth
Cir. 1967) (the court hints at the same conclusion); Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F Supp.
677 (SD.N.Y. 1967) (stating that a "C" type stock for assets reorganization is not a
"sale" unless there is also a commitment by the seller to liquidate).
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5 Management Abuse Plus
The above discussion has dealt prinarily with actions by a corporanon or its shareholders against directors. However, 10b-5 has recently
been utilized in another direction. In Superintendent of Insurance v
Bankers Life and Casualty Company, 4 Bankers Life agreed to sell all
of its stock in Manhattan Casualty Company, a wholly owned subsidiary, to two individuals. In connection with their purchase, the
buyers fabricated a plan to utilize Manhattan's assets, rather than their
own funds, to pay Bankers for the sale. 40 5 Unfortunately for the defendants,40 6 the property belonging to Manhattan which they selected
to appropriate was $5,000,000 of Umted States Treasury bonds. Manhattan's board was then induced to sell the bonds with the expectation
that it would in turn net the proceeds for the sale. Actually what Manhattan received in return was a fully-collateralized $5,000,000 certificate
of deposit, but the certficate was worthless.
After viewing the gravamen of the complaint as alleging a misappropnation of assets, the district court restricted its central inquiry to
Bankers' sale of Manhattan stock.407 It then dismissed the suit,40 8 relying
on Birnbaum, because the plaintiff Manhattan took no part in that sale
(even though the proceeds of its Treasury bonds were used to pay the
purchase price) The court of appeals affirmed on a different basisma deception theory involving the contract for the sale of the bondsstating that "[w]ith respect to the terms of the [bond] sale, neither the
purchaser or the seller
was deceived or defrauded." 410 In addition,
the court held that there is "a structural difference between the sale of
the corporation's bonds at a concededly fair price and the subsequent
fraudulent misappropriation of the proceeds received." '". Thus, to
summarize, the lower court found plaintiff's status as a seller to be
404. 92 S.Ct. 165 (1971).
405. The plaintiff's complaint was grounded upon three transactions: Manhattan's
sale of the Treasury bonds; the sale of Manhattan stock by Bankers Life; and certain
transactions involving the certificate of deposit. The court explicitly stated that its
inquiry was restricted to the sale of bonds. 92 S.Ct. 165, 169 n.10 (1971)
406. It would be interesting to speculate on the outcome of this case had $5,000,000
of land been sold instead.
407. 300 F Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
408. Id. at-1095.
409. 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970).
410. Id. at 360.
411. Id.
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irrelevant and dismissed the action because the case dealt primarily with
misappropriation not within the scope of Iob-5. On appeal it was held
that there was no deception in the sale in which the plaintiff participated
as a seller because the price was not unfair.
The Supreme Court looked only upon the sale of the Treasury
bonds412 and found fraud m connection with this sale "because a seller
[Manhattan] was duped into believing that it
. would receive the
proceeds" when in fact there was a scheme in the making to insure that
it would not. From the standpoint of when 1ob-5 can be used to remedy
a breach of fiduciary duty, Justice Douglas was equivocal. He agreed
that Congress had no intention that 10(b) be used to regulate transactions which constitute "no more than internal corporate mismanagement." 413 But in an earlier paragraph of the opinion, he deemed it
irrelevant that the fraud was perpetrated by an officer of the corporation.414

According to the Court, the crux of the case was that Manhat-

tan was injured by a deceptive practice which "touched" its sale of a
security as an investor.415
6. Conclusion
In addition to the above, the Supreme Court's Bankers Life decision
dictated that "Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and
restrictively" 416 The Court as well announced the doctrine that fraud,
if it "touches" a securities transaction, will be actionable under lob-5
regardless of the fact that it is perpetrated by an officer of the corporanon. Responding to the Bankers Life edict, Judge Whipple, m Tully
v. Mott Supermarkets, Ino.,4 7 declared that 10b-5 was not a "select
remedy" available only in "the fortuitous absence of corporate mis-

management."

418

Since under the new "touching concept" almost any instance of
fraudulent corporate mismanagement is now automatically converted
into a Rule 10b-5 case, it is suggested that the third Birnbaum prong is
about to be "flexibly touched" out of existence.
412. 92 S.Ct. 165 (1971).
413. Id. at 169.

Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
Id.
1972 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T93;377 (D.N.J. 1972).
418. Id. 91,934.
414.
415.
416.
417.
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Aborted Transactions
Although the courts appear to have curtailed their rigid adherence
to the Birnbaum doctrine,41 9 this leniency has been evidenced only in
selective cases and there remains to be considered those situations commonly referred to as "abortive" purchases or sales. 420 Neither section
10(b) nor Rule lob-5 mandate that a plaintiff be a purchaser or seller. 1
As has been pointed out, this requirement originated in the Birnbaum
decision where the court was distinguishing those situations involving
fiduciary misconduct not actionable under Rule I ob-5 42 It is submitted
that in the absence of a fiduciary relationship, the crucial inquiry in
determining standing to sue under the Rule should be the influence of
the fraudulent activity on the plaintiff's investment decision rather than
the overly technical inquiry as to his status as a purchaser or seller. The
purchaser-seller requirement appears to be unduly restrictive when it
is realized that the decision to purchase or sell is logically indistinguishable from a decision to abstain from such transactions. Ironically, the
landmark Second Circuit opinion in Texas Gulf hinted at a recognition
of this thesis in defining materiality The court said material facts are
those which may affect the desire of investors to "buy, sell, or hold the
company's securities." 423
In Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc.,424 plaintiff secured an
option to purchase all the shares of Puretec. The option was coupled
with an exclusive agency contract authorizing the plaintiff to locate a
buyer. The plaintiff argued that the two sole stockholders of Puretec
hid no intention of honoring the option agreement if they could secure
a more favorable offer through their own private negotiations. The
plaintiff further alleged that it assigned the options, but the Puretec
shareholders refused to sell. Despite the fact that a sale was never
consummated, the court allowed the plaintiff's suit under Rule 1ob-5,
stating that it found no necessity for a consummated transaction. 425
419. See notes 315-36 supra and accompanying text.
420. These situations arise when an investor has decided either to purchase or sell
and the fraudulent influence of the defendant aborts the implementation of that investment decision.
421. See text of Rule, supra note 22.
422. See notes 337-43 supra and accompanying text.
423. 401 F.2d at 849 [Emphasis supplied].
424. 290 F Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
425. Although the purchase option could have been considered as a basis for recovery in such a case, there would be no need for the court to discuss whether or not
there was a consummated transaction because the option would be within the gtatutory
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In Goodman v. H. Hentz and Co.,426 the court permitted an action
against a broker whose fraudulent scheme resulted in a purchase by the
plaintiff of non-existent securities. In noting that the purchase of fictitious securities could never be consummated, the court found it incorrect to interpret the "in connection with" language of Rule lob-5 as
if it read "in the purchase or sale" rather than "in connection with the
purchase or sale." 427 Recovery under 10b-5 was allowed.
Thus, the above two decisions, when read together, indicate that not
only is a consummated transaction unnecessary to a 10b-5 cause of
action, but also that the fraudulent activity need only be connected with
a purchase or sale. This inroad into Birnbaum is both clear and justified.
However, there exists another possible inroad into Birnbaum which has
not properly been pursued by the courts. This involves an interpretation of what injury to the plaintiff absent a purchase or sale should be
actionable under 10b-5 Specifically, there exists the possibility that a
current owner of shares who intends to sell may be fraudulently induced
to retain them, and correspondingly a potential investor with the intent
and means to purchase specific securities may be fraudulently prevented
from purchasing. This persuasion to forego the consummation of intended transactions may be said to render the above described parties
abortive sellers or purchasers who should be able to seek relief in a 10b-5
action.
1. Broker's Fraud
Perhaps the best example of the abortive purchaser-seller theory is
presented in circumstances in which brokers have fraudulently induced
their customers to pursue or forego a particular course of action. A classic
illustration can be found in Stockwell v. Reynolds and Co.428 Therein
the broker defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiffs42 to retain
certain shares after they had expressed a desire to sell. After a market
decline, plaintiffs sold their shares at a loss. The plaintiffs thereafter
definition of a purchase-a contract to purchase. See notes 302-14 supra and accompanying text. By using the agency contract as a basis for relief, the court seems to
eliminate the purchaser-seller requirement and find liability on something less than a
mutually binding executory agreement. 1969 DuKE L.J. 349.
426. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
427. Id. at 444.
428. 252 F Supp. 215 (SD.N.Y. 1965).
429. One plaintiff merely retained his shares while another plaintiff actually purchased
additional shares in reliance on the broker's fraudulent statements.
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brought an action against the broker for damages. In rejecting the defendant's contention that plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers,
the court looked to the "in connection with" language in stating that
section 10 and Rule 10b-5 "do not require that the purchase or sale
immediately follow the alleged fraud." 430
Although both plaintiffs sold their stock before trial, Judge Bonsai
noted that "a seller is injured as much when he suffers a loss on the
sale of securities which he has been fraudulently induced to retain as
when he is fraudulently induced to sell them." 431 This position has
432
received little judicial following.
Judge Bonsal's inquiry into the injury sustained by the plaintiff is
based upon the recogition that the resolution to purchase, sell, or retain
is fundamentally nothing more than the translation of an investment
decision into an overt act. Once an investment intent is formulated,
it is then coupled with some outward manifestation to attain its fruition.
Where an investor holds cash and reaches a favorable value judgment
regarding a certain security, an investment intent is formulated. This
intention is carried out by the act of purchase. On the other hand, if
the investor's portfolio already contains this item, the act of retention
is the product of his decision. Were a fraud to be injected into the
above decision-making process, under Birnbaum only the purchase
translation would yield standing under 10b-5
The phrase "in connection with a purchase or sale" indicates breadth.
It makes clear the fact that Congress was speaking not only to the legal
conception of a transfer but also to the critical foundations upon which
an execution is based.
It is suggested that a focus upon the entire investment decisionmaking- process is the most efficacious manner by which to define the
scope of Iob-5 Once a judgment has been tainted by fraudulent means,
it seems unduly arbitrary to remedy such an evil only when the resolution is translated into a purchase or sale.4u
430. 252 F Supp. at 219.
431. Id.

42. Compare Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Co., 241 F Supp. 369 (D. Del.
1965) qwatb Morrow v. Schapiro, CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 1 93,251 (E.D. Mo. 1971)

433. The utility of this theory has not gone totally unrecognmzed. An analysis detached from the purchaser-seller rule has been observed in Neuman v. Electronic
Specialties, Inc., CCH Fan. Sac. L. REP. 1 92,591 (N.D. IM. 1969), wherein the court
held: "[Als a condition of any recovery under the private damage remedy, the shareholders must prove that his reliance on any alleged representation was the cause of his
refusal to [sell]."
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2. The Timespan of Causation
One further problem remains to be considered if the Birnbaum rule
is to be replaced with a workable substitute. If situations exist in which
the fraudulent activity can be related to an investment decision made
at an earlier time, necessarily there must be a determination as to how
long the defendant's fraudulent activity can reasonably be expected to
influence the plaintiff's inaction. For example, assume an investor
desires to purchase 5,000 shares of XYZ corporation currently selling
at $50 per share, and his broker fraudulently induces him not to purchase.
If within three days the price has risen to $55 per share, should not the
investor be able to maintain an action alleging that he has been damaged to the extent of $25,000 by the broker's fraud? If so, the investor
may want to wait until the price reaches $65 per share (for example, a
month later) before he brings his action. Clearly, such a delay would not
entitle plaintiff to recover $75,000 because there is a point in time at
which the broker's fraud*ceases to have causal connection to the plaintiff's entire loss. In the recent case of Morrow v. Schapiro, 4 a district
court in Missouri, although apparently infected with the Birnbaum
philosophy, 35 denied relief to an aborted seller who alleged that the
directors and officers of the corporation fraudulently induced him to
retain his shares at a time when the defendants themselves had an investment strategy of selling. 3 The plaintiff, realizing that his plight was
hopeless without a purchase or sale, argued that the defendant's fraudulent scheme related back to when plaintiff was first induced by these
same defendants to purchase the shares.4 37 The court held that since the
plaintiff's purchase was initially profitable,438 his theory failed. Implicit
in the decision is an indication that the defendant's fraud could not have
been a material factor for so long a period of time. Thus, it is suggested
that a case-by-case determination of the duration of defendant's fraudulent activity and the extent to which it could reasonably influence the
434. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
435. Id.

V

93,251 (ED. Mo.

1971).

436. Plaintiff purchased hIs shares in 1969 for $582,620. When he was fraudulently
deceived into retaining his stock, it had a market value of $700,000 which had declined drastically to $56,000 at the trial date.
437. Cf. Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Co., 241 F Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965),
which dealt with facts similar to Vine. The court granted relief to an aborted seller
in a merger situation by examining the original purchase by the plaintiff of the merged
corporation's shares.
438. The court was referring to the unrealized increase in market 'value from
$582,620 to $700,000.
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plaintiff either to hold or to refrain from purchasing is far superior
to an examnation of the facts to find a purchase or sale. By allowing
such actions to serve as notice to all those who desire to profit through
fraudulent activities in securities negotiations and transactions, the goal
of fair trading based on equal access to investment data can be achieved.
DISPLACEMENT

As previously noted, the securities acts were drawn so as to establish
a particular balance between the broad injunction power of the SEC
and the limited power of investors. In carefully circumscribed circumstances, the acts expressly provide for private causes of action in the
event of particular types of fraudulent conduct-this right is contingent
upon the proof of specific elements and is often subject to enumerated
defenses.
As originally interpreted, section 10(b) did no violence to this statutory framework as no private right of action was expressly provided in
that section. However, once the courts implied a private cause of action
under section 10(b)4 1 and expanded its scope to the same situations
covered by the express provisions of the acts, conflict developed. Section 10(b) actions were not subject to the same limitations as those
brought under the express sections. As a result, section 10(b) has become more appealing to potential plaintiffs as the basis for a cause of
action and has displaced the express sections of both acts, rendering
them superfluous. This section will discuss the limitations of the express
provisions which have precipitated this obsolescence.

Statute of Linitations
Civil actions brought under the express provisions of the Securities
Act-Section 11 (concerning registration statements) 440 or section 12
439. See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cit. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946); Speed v. Transamerica Corporation, 71 F Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947),
99 F Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Osborne v. Mallory,
86 F Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
440. 15 U.S.C. S 77k (1970). Although a 1ob-5 claim was abandoned in Fischman v.
Raytheon, 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), dictum in that case indicates that a buyer can
utilize lob-5 "whether or not he could maintain a suit under § 11 of the 1933 Act"
because 10b-5 requires proof of fraud, 188 F.2d at 787 Other cases have held that
purchasers of registered securities can only sue under section 11; see Montague v.
Electromc Corporation of America, 76 F Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Rosenberg v.
Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948) Therefore, it should be noted
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(dealing with prospectuses or communications)

441-are

governed by the

statute of limitations provisions in section 13.442 Since no statute of

limitations is expressly provided under section 10 of the Exchange Act,
the limitatons statute in the forum state governs. 443 This usually results
in a longer statute of limitations due to either a longer limitation period
or the designation of a later date regarding when the statute begns to
run.444 Due to the broad scope of Rule 10b-5, it may be possible to
utilize this rule even though the same suit under sections 11 and 12
might be barred by the statute of limitations in section 13.
445
Similarly in the Exchange Act, section 9 (market mampulation)

and section 18 (filed documents),446 prescribe their own statute of limitations as one year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation and no more than three years after the violation itself actually
occurred. Since no civil remedies are expressed in section 17447 of the
Securities Act or in sections 13,448 14" 9 or 15 (c) 450 of the Exchange
Act, they present no barrier to lob-5's encroachment as far as the applicable statute of limitations is concerned since actions thereunder are
also governed by the statutes effective in the forum state.
that section 11 and its relative desirability in obtaining relief as opposed to a 10b-5
action is discussed herein as if the two actions were or could be utilized in regard to
the same fact situation.
441. i U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
442. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970) Section 13 provides:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under
section 77k or 771 (2) of this title unless brought within one year after the
discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the
action is to enforce a liability created under section 771 (1) of this title,
unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based.
In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created
under section 77k or 771 (1) of this tie more than three years after the
security bona fide offered to the public, or under section 771 (2) of this
title more than three years after the sale.
443. See, e.g., Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1967);
Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967); Fratt v; Robinson, 203 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1953); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th- Cir. 1956); Fischman v.
Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
-444. In most states the statute begins to run when the fraud is or should have bien
discovered, which avoids the three year maximum in section 13.
445. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
446. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
447. 15 U.S.C. § 77q-(1970).
448. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
449. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
450. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
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Security for Costs
Several of the sections mentioned above (section 11 of the Securities
Act and sections 9 and 18 of the Exchange Act) specifically provide
that the courts in their discretion may require security to be posted for
both costs and attorney fees to lessen the possibility of harassment and
nuisance value litigation. Section 10, Rule 10b-5, and the other provisions that do not provide expressly for civil remedies have no such
requirement (section 17 of the Securities Act is also included here), and
therefore they often enable prospective plaintiffs to escape the security
451
for costs requirement.
Privity
Section 12(1),452 which incorporates section 5,453 grants an express
civil remedy for violations regarding the sale of a security during the
pre-filing, post-filing, and post-affective period of the registration statement. Section 12(2)... grants a remedy for fraud in the sale of a security Both sections 12(1) and 12(2) require privity between the
plaintiff and defendant. However, a cause of action under 1Ob-5, which
has been held to encompass section 12 violations 45 5 does not require
pnvity
Reliance
Section 11 of the Securities Act provides that any purchaser or seller
may sue when there is either an untrue material statement or omission
of a material fact in a registration statement. 450 However, reliance must
be affirmatively shown if the issuer had publicly made available a financial statement covering a period of at least 12 months subsequent to the
effective date of the registration statement.45 ' This does not appear to
be overly-burdensome because the statute further provides that reliance
can be shown without establishing that the plaintiff read the registra451. See, e.g., Epstein v. Solitron Devices, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,127 (2d
Cir. 1968); McClune v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. dented,
368 U.S. 939 (1961).
452. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
453. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
454. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
455. See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).

456. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970)
457. Id.
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tion statement. Reliance is also expressly required m an action under
section 18458 of the Exchange Act.
Although actions brought under 10b-5 seem to require the plaintiff
to establish reliance in a misrepresentation situation, as opposed to a
non-disclosure setting,45 9 the other advantageous provisions m section
10 and Rule 10b-5 negate the notion that proving reliance would be a

sigmficant factor in determining which section to use.
Defenses
Section 11 of the Securities Act extends to everyone, except the issuer,
the defense of due diligence-the standard of care being that of a prudent man in the management of his property.4 60 Section 12(2) also

provides two specific defenses. The defendant may escape liability upon
a showing that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the misstatements or omissions.40 ' In addition, plaintiff's suit is barred upon a showing of his knowledge of the
untruth or omission. 2 A possible defense to a violation of section 9

of the Exchange Act would be lack of scienter or requisite intent since,
via subsection (c), only willful violations are actionable.4 Similarly,
section 18 delineates the two defenses of good faith and lack of knowledge. 4 6 A suit instituted under 10b-5 and section 10 of the Exchange
Act has no expressed defenses but some courts increase the plaintiff's
burden by requiring reliance,465 scienter, 6 and causation. 6 7
Damages
In any action alleging violations of the various provisions of the Exchange Act, the amount of damages recoverable is limted to actual
damages by section 28 (a).

4 08

Hence, a 1ob-5 action has no advantageous

position in this regard. However, several sections in the Securities Act
have specific damage provisions. Section 11 limits damages to the amount
458. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).

459. See notes 197-98 supra and accompanying text.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

465.
466.
467.
468.

15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
ld.
15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
See notes 175-222,supraand accompanying text.
See notes 35-122 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 224-64 supra and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1970).
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paid for the security, less its value at the tume of suit, but in no event
can the damages exceed the total offering price. 69 Similarly, section 12
sets the damages at the consideration paid less the income received or
at actual damages if the security has been sold.470 In light of these provisions, suit under 10b-5 appears to offer no substantial advantage or
disadvantage with the possible exception of section 11.
Other
Section 17 of the Securities Act contains basically the same wording
as Rule iob-5, but, like section 12(2), it can only be utilized by a
defrauded buyer.4 7 ' Rule 10b-5, however, is much broader and provides implied civil remedies for both buyers and sellers due to the "in
connection with a purchase or sale of securities" language. Also, section
15 (c) 472 of the Exchange Act prohibits market mampulative schemes,
but applies only to brokers. Section 9 of the Exchange Act4 73 provides
similar proscriptions regarding any person who "rigs" the market, but
is only relevant to securities listed on a national exchange. Since 10b-5
applies to all fraudulent activities, it can be employed to combat these
evils, as well as those which do not involve a broker or a security listed
on a national exchange. Finally, 10b-5 may be the basis of an action
to recover for violations of the proxy rules expressed in section 14(e)
of the Exchange Act,474 if, in reliance on the proxies, plaintiff either
purchased or sold securities. 5
TIPPEE LIABILITY

In the landmark decision of Cady, Roberts and Co.,476 the SEC dealt
a decisive blow against the trading of a corporation's securities by corporate "insiders" 177 on the basis of material, 478 non-public information
469. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
470. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
471. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970)
472. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970)
473. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
474. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970)
475. See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380
Inc. v. Janoff, 266 F Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
476. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).

F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967); Globus,

477. Generally, insiders are considered to include officers, directors, controlling shareholders, and responsible employees of the issuer. Note, Securities Fraud: Caveat TippeeThe Creation and Development of a Doctrine, 33 U. Pitr. L. REv. 79, 80 n.6 (1971).
See also, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968Y.
478. "A material fact is one to which a reasonable man would attach importance
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about their corporation. Based upon alleged violations of section 10(b)
of the 1934 Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, the SEC proceeded against
the Cady, Roberts brokerage firm and against one of its partners. The
gravamen of the complaint was that a representative of the defendant
firm, who was a member of the Board of Directors of Curtiss-Wright
Corp., had divulged information on a selective basis concerning an
impending Curtiss-Wright dividend cut to Cady, Roberts prior to the
public announcement of that information. On the basis of this disclosure, stock held in various discretionary accounts was sold by Cady,
Roberts.
In accepting a settlement offer, the SEC described the elements giving rise to the duty to disclose inside information before trading:
[T]he obligation rests on two pnncipal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is deal-

Ing.

479

It should be noted that the dual elements in the Cady, Roberts testthe "inside relationship" and the "inherent unfairness" in the use of the
information to the detrment of the investing public-portend liability
for the corporate insider only But, history has shown that not all corporate insiders are parsimnomous with corporate secrets. Occasionally,
they have disclosed this information to close friends and business acquaintances for use in the market. This type of conduct has raised the
serious question as to the extent of liability, if any, of these "tippees" 480
for their trading on the basis of this non-public information.
It would seem that a finding of liability on the part of the "tippee"
would be consistent with the purposes of the securities law 481 Morein determining his choice whether to make a sale or not." Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp.
395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), citing List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-63 (2d Cir.
1965).
479. 40 S.E.C. at 912.
480. It appears that the term "tippee" was corned by Professor Loss in his 1961
treatise. 3 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1450.
481. "The maintenance of fair and honest markets in securities and the prevention
of inequitable and unfair practices in such markets are the primary objectives of the
federal securities laws:' Investors Management Co., BNA Sac. Ra. & L. RaP. (August
4, 1971) No. 113 at H-3 (SEC July 29, 1971).
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over, to permit nppees to trade where their "uppors" are prohibited,
merely because of the absence of an "inside relationship" with the corporate issuer, would be to create an obvious loophole in trading regulation-the taint is indistinguishable in both instances.
The conceptual basis of "tippee" liability is the principle that all
members of the investing public should be subject to the same market
risks. The fruition of this concept requires market disclosure of all
material information, regardless of the identity of the possessor. 482 In
view of the fact that "tippees" may possess information of the Cady,
Roberts variety, and that they may deal with it to the detriment of the
investing public, the question arises as to the theories upon which they
may be held liable.
The Bases for Tippee Liability-Rule 10b-5
Rule lob-5 makes unlawful the utilization of manipulative and deceptive devices by "any person." 483 Consequently, a "tippee" comes within
the prohibitions of the Rule when he trades without disclosing material,
non-public information in his possession. However, it must be remembered that one of the two elements in the Cady, Roberts test-the existence of a special inside relationship to the corporate issuer-is not
met by the "tippee" since he is, by definition, an outsider. Thus, the
courts have been confronted with the problem of adapting the Cady,
Roberts test to various "tippee" situations. Several different theories
have been advanced to determine "tippee" liability
1 Professor Loss
Prior to the Cady, Roberts decision, Professor Loss advanced the
proposition that "tippees" might be held liable under Rule 10b-5 upon
a showing that they knew or had reason to know that the insider's tip
was a "breach of trust." Professor Loss reasoned that "[t]o hold
'tippees' liable under Rule 10b-5 when they had no reason to suspect
482. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)

Congress has

also stated: "The concept of a free and open market for securities necessarily implies
that the buyer and seller are acting in the exercise of enlightened judgment as to what
constitutes a fair price." S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).

And, the Supreme Court has reiterated: "A fundamental purpose, common to [the
securities laws], was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry
" SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)
483. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
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that their informant was an insider might result in -an unreasonable
entrapment of innocent persons." 484 The requirement that the tippee
have actual or constructive knowledge that the information was disclosed in "breach of trust" has been criticized, 485 but it appears that the
thrust of Loss' theory, the necessity of knowledge of a credible, corporate-related source, is vital.
2. Tippees Are Also Insiders
In Ross v. Lwht,4s6 a federal district court in New York was presented
with an action by sellers of stock for damages under Rule 10b-5, alleging that buyers purchased on the basis of inside information made available to them by corporate-insider friends. After determining that Rule
10b-5 requires corporate insiders to disclose material, non-public facts
known to them by reason of inside positions before purchasing stock,
the court went on to hold that the outsider tippees "were insiders
also." 487 Thus, the court apparently attempted to disclaim any difference between insiders and "tippees" for the purposes of Rule 10b-5.
The only problem with this position is the semantical dilemma caused
by the fact that Cady, Roberts has reduced the term "insider" to a word
of art representing one who occupies "a relationship giving access,
directly or mdirectly, to information intended to be available only for
",48 Since
a corporate purpose and not for the benefit of anyone..
a "uppee" is clearly not an insider within this description, the classification of a "tippee" as an insider is unnecessarily confusing. This fact
may have been recognized by the Licht4l court because it offered as
alternate bases for liability the theories that defendants "would seem to
have been 'tippees' . and subject to the same duties as insiders," and
for aiding and abetting a
that defendants "would be equally liable
violation of Rule 10b-5 "490
3 Texas Gulf Sulphur and Investors Management Co.
Dictum in the Second Circuit opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur491
appears to support the alternative holding in Licht that "tippee" liability
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.

3 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1451.
Note, s;pra note 477 See also A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 7.5(6) (3).
263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Id. at 409.
Cady, Roberts and Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
Ross v. Licht, 263 P Supp. 395, 410 (SD.N.Y. 1967).
Id.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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is coterrmnous with insider liability, while recognizing that tippees are
not insiders. The court noted that" 'tippees'
conduct is equally vio,492
source.
inside
their
of
conduct
the
lative of the Rule as
The most comprehensive treatment of "tippee" liability to date is the
SEC decision in Investors Management Co 493 Investment advisers, mutual funds, and investment partnerships received information from
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, the prospective underwriter of
a new Douglas Aircraft Corp. issue, of substantially reduced Douglas
earnings and earnings estimates. Immediately prior to the disclosure,
analysts had viewed Douglas' earnings position as favorable, and Douglas
itself had forecast earnings of $8 to $12 per share for 1967 The new
information, which was disclosed to Merrill Lynch on June 20, 1966
indicated no earnings for 1966 and expected only about half the original
projection for 1967 This information was leaked by Merrill Lynch
to defendants on June 21, 1966 and by June 23 they had sold 133,400
Douglas shares from long positions and 21,200 from short positions for
a total in excess of $13,300,000. Douglas publicly announced the reduced
earnings figures on June 24.
After determining that defendant's conduct was violative of Rule
1ob-5, the SEC announced four elements necessary for the imposition
of responsibility in "tippees" (1.) The information must be material;49 4
(2.) it must be non-public; 4 5 (3.) the "tippee," whether he receives the
information directly or indirectly, must know or have reason to know
that it is non-public and improperly obtained; 496 and (4.) the informa492. id. at 852-53.
493. BNA SEC. RE. &L. REP. (August 4, 1971) No. 113 (SEC July 29, 1971).
494. Id. at H-4. "Among the factors to be considered in determining whether mformation is material under this test are the degree of its specificity, the extent to
which it differs from information previously publicly disseminated, and its reliability in
"
light of its nature and source and the circumstances under which it was received.
Id. Furthermore, the SEC recognized that "the fact that respondents acted immediately or very shortly after receipt of the information to effect sales
is in itself
evidence of its materiality" id.
495. The fact that rumors had been circulating on June 21 to 23 was found not to
constitute public disclosure on three grounds: (1) the rumors were not specific as to
figures and projections, (2) they were not attributed to a corporation-informed source,
and (3) their circulation was limited. Id. at H-4, 5.
496. The SEC stated that the appropriate test was neither a special relationship
with the issuer giving access to non-public information, nor actual knowledge. Constructive knowledge was found to be the guideline. The SEC said:
We consider that one who obtains possession of material, non-public corporate information, which he has reason to know emanates from a corporate
source, and which by itself places him in a position superior to other m-
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non must be a factor in the "tippee's" decision to effect the transaction. 407
It is interesting to note that the SEC rejected defendants' argument
that their obligations under the anti-fraud provisions were less because
they were "remote tippees" who received their information from other
"tppees." The SEC commented that: "If [defendants] are viewed as
indirect recipients of the Douglas information, the same criteria for
finding a violation of the antifraud provisions
apply Although the
case of such an indirect recipient may present more questions of factual
proof of the requisite knowledge, the need for the protections of those
provisions in the tippee area is unaffected." 49'
The SEC sm-ilarly disallowed a contention that defendants, as investment advisers, had a fiduciary duty to their clients to sell their Douglas
stock upon learning of poor Douglas earnings, commenting that "[t]he
obligations of a fiduciary do not include the performing of an illegal
act."

409

In summary, it appears that the SEC has adopted Professor Loss'
vestors, thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that information
within the purview and restraints of the anti-fraud provisions. Both elements
are here present as they were in the Cady, Roberts case. When a recipient
of such corporate information, knowing of having reason to know that the
corporate information is non-public, nevertheless uses it to effect a transaction in the corporation's securities for his own benefit, we think his conduct cannot be viewed as free of culpability under any sound interpretation or application of the antifraud provisions.
Considerations of both fairness and effective enforcement demand that the
standard as to the requisite knowledge be satisfied by proof that the recipient
had reason to know of the non-public character of the information, and
that it not be necessary to establish actual knowledge of that fact or, as suggested by respondents, of a breach of fiduciary duty The imposition of
responsibility where one has reason to know of the determinative factors
in violative conduct is in keeping with the broad remedial design of the
securities law and has been applied under other of their provisions as well
as the antifraud provisions.
Id. at H-5. In determining "reason to know," the SEC states that it is appropriate to
consider the surrounding circumstances, including the nature of the information; the
manner in which it was obtained; the facts relating to the informant, including his business or other relation to the recipient and to the source of his information; and the
recipients sophistication and knowledge of related facts. Id.
497. "Turning next to the requirement that the information received be a factor in the
investment decision, we are of the opimon that where a transaction of the kind indicated by the information (e.g., a sale or short sale upon adverse information)
is effected by the recipient prior to its public dissemination, an inference arises that
the information was such a factor. The recipient of course may seek to overcome such
inference'by countervailing evidence." Id.
498. Id.
499. Id. at H-6.
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test of constructive knowledge in confirming the Second Circuit view
that "uppee" liability is coterminous with insider liability

The Invest-

ors Management Co. case also illustrates the staggering amounts that can
be involved in "tippee" cases-in that case over $13,300,000.
Additional Tippee Debilities
Since both section 10-b and Rule lob-5 prohibit the use of material
inside information 5°° "by any person," 501 it is clear that both the
"tippor," -502 in divulging inside information, and the "tippee," 50m3
trading on the basis of such information violate the securities laws. Several interesting questions have arisen as to the ultimate burden of liability in suits involving both tippee and tippor.
1 Contribution
In Ross v. Licht, °4 a suit by defrauded plaintiffs alleging a conspiracy
between corporate insider "tippors" and their "tippees," the three tippees were held joindy and severally liable with the tippors. While the
precise issue of contribution among defendants was not raised, the
policy of the securities acts seems to indicate that contribution among
defendants is intended.505 Thus, the first debility of the tippee becomes
apparent. In a suit joimng both a tippee and his tippor as defendants,
where both are found to have violated Rule 10b-5, it would appear that
500. Note, Caveat Tippor, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 103 (1971)
501. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971)
502. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
503. Investors Management Co., BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. (August 4, 1971) No. 113
(SEC July 29, 1971)
504. 263 F Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
505. Note, supra note 477, at 98. Therein the author points out the securities acts
contain three contribution provisions. Section 11(f) of the Securities Act of 1933
contains the statement that: "All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) shall be jointly and severally liable, and every person who becomes liable
to make any payment under this section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately, would have been liable to make the same
payment, unless the person who became liable was, and the other was not, guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentations." Sections 9(e) and 18(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934
provide that: "Every person who becomes liable to make any payment under this
subsection may recover contributions as in cases of contract from any person who, if
joined in the original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment" The
author notes that in each of these sections, civil liability was expressly provided, and
he also comments that the 1933 Act makes the provision for contribution against one
who is guilty of no fraudulent misrepresentation. This difference may cause the courts
some future difficulty in determining the issue of contribution.
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the tppee will be held to an equal degree of liability with the tippor,
although the latter's conduct may evince the greater mens rea.

2. In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands
At times, tippors have "divulged" false information to uppees, and
the tippees, acting on the basis of this information, have purchased or
sold securities and thus have sustained losses. In suits by the defrauded
"tippees" against their "tippors," the decisions appear to be confused as
to whether the defendant tippor may raise, as an absolute defense, the
doctrines of in par delicto or "unclean hands."
In Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,50 the court held that plaintiff's status
as a "tippee" made the defenses of unclean hands and in par delicto
available, but noted that their exercise rests with the discretion of the
court, saying: "[T]he question must be one of policy- which decision
will have the better consequences in promoting the objective of the
securities laws by increasing the protection to be afforded the investing
public." 507 In determining that the policy of the securities acts dictates
that a "tippee" have no recourse against his "tippor"-the court noted:
It is true that if a tippee has no remedy against an insider's private
falsehoods, little deterrent against such conduct will exist; the insider may have free rein. But, as against this, there is another
danger. If a uppee can sue he has, in effect, an enforceable warranty that secret information is true.
[W]e think it important that tippees, who present the same
threat to the investing public as do insiders themselves, should be
offered appropriate discouragement. We conclude that the better
choice is to leave upon persons believing themselves tippees the
restraint arising from the fear of irretrievable loss should they act
upon a tip which proves to have been untrue. 0 8
A result similar to that in Kuehnert was reached in Wohl v. Blair o9
Therein, plaintiff had received a false tip from his broker which encouraged him to buy stock. The court denied plaintiff's motion to strike
the defenses of unclean hands and in pari delicto on the ground that
customers should be forced to deal on the basis of inside information
"at their own risk."
506.
507.
508.
509.

412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 704.
Id. at 705.
50 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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The decision in Wohl was later repudiated in Nathanson v. Weis,
Voismn, Canon, Inc.510 As in Kuehnert, the court viewed the question
of whether to allow the defenses of unclean hands and in pari delicto
in terms of "what policy
would best serve to carry out the prime
purpose of the securities laws to protect the investing public." "' But
the Nathanson court concluded that the securities laws were preventative in nature, and that the best way to eliminate the practice of tipping
would be to place the ultimate loss upon the tippor, thus discouraging
him from malng the minal disclosure.5 12 In order to best achieve this
result, it was concluded that the defenses of unclean hands and in pari
delicto should be disallowed so as to insure maximum tippor punishment.
It appears that both Kuehnert and Nathanson agree that the primary
purpose of the securities laws is the protection of the investing public.
They also implicitly agree that the allowance of the defenses of unclean
hands and in pari delicto rests in the discretion of the court. It would
appear that their only area of disagreement is how, through the exercise
of discretion, the court may best promote the purpose of the securities
laws. Kuehnert maintains that the tippor is sufficiently deterred by
way of the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision, criminal penalties, etc., and
therefore the avaricious tippees should be subjected to similar pressures.
Nathanson disagrees, preferring to bring full judicial pressure to bear
on the tippor, hoping thereby to shut off the flow of inside informa51 8
tion.

Conclusion
After observing the judicial activity under Rule 10b-5 in the microcosm of "tippee" liability, it becomes apparent that lob-5 is being
expanded into a universal fraud remedy A tippee, no matter how far
removed from the corporate source of the information, may be liable
under Rule 10b-5 for non-disclosure of inside information if the four
elements of the Investors Management test are satisfied.51 4 In addition,
if the tippee does disclose the inside information, thus becoming a
tippor, and if the information turns out to be false, the Nathanson view
would allow suit by the defrauded tippee against the tippor. Thus, the
510. 325 F Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
511. ld. at 52-53.
512. Id. at 57
513. The Natbanson decision has been criticized in Note, supra note 500, with some
success.
514. See notes 494-97 supra and accompanying text.
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tippee will be liable to his buyer or seller for non-disclosure of material,
non-public information which is true, and he will also be liable for disclosure of information which is false. Certainly, this is a long judicial
step from the original interpretation of Rule 10b-5 as a purely SEC
oriented injunction provision.
CONCLUSION

In the years since a private right of action was first implied under
Rule 10b-5, the courts have experienced little success in developing
a unified approach to the elements of that right of action. Furthermore,
the judicially created Birnbaum doctrine has imposed a seemingly arbitrary element in determinung standing of plaintiffs to sue under Rule
1ob-5. The most obvious cause of this disjointed situation is the absence
of clear Congressional intent concerning the scope of section 10(b).
It is submitted that a private right of action under 10b-5 is proper and
necessary. The other provisions in both securities acts providing for
private rights of action fail to cover effectively the spectrum of securities frauds.
The Birnbaum doctrine was judicially created, and should be judicially destroyed. This could be accomplished either by limiting that
case to its facts, or by restricting its application to those cases involving
breaches of fiduciary duties. The resulting expansion of the scope of
Rule 10b-5 would be harmonious with the announced purposes of the
securities acts. The argument that abolition of the purchaser-seller
rule would open wide the doors to a multitude of actions is countered
by the fact that the remaining elements of the 10b-5 action such as
scienter, materiality, reliance, and causation are sufficient to eliminate,
frivolous suits.
Therefore, absent a Congressional redraft of the statute, it is apparent
that the judiciary must act in concert to clarify the elements of Rule
1Ob-5.
There has been a great social cost incurred due to the proliferation of
litigation under the Rule. Certainty is a mandate in the realm of securities counselling which is no longer possible due to the confusion concering Rule lob-5. One of the most effective methods to abate this
confusion would be a concerted effort by the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari to those cases presenting issues upon which the circuits are
in conflict and to deal authoritatively with the problems presented.

